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Foreword 
This document summarizes policy tools in U.S. agriculture. In the 50 years since the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 a wide array of farm programs has evolved. It is important for the public 
to recognize that, due to numerous factors. wide variations in agricultural production create income 
instability for farmers and ranchers as well as uncertainty in supplies and prices for processors and 
consumers. Individually, farmers and ranchers are not able to control the numerous variables that 
affect agriculture. Consequently, farm policy is an important function for the U.S. government. 
The form and degree of government involvement in policy is the subject of continuous debate. 
In this document, government policy tools impacting agriculture are individually reviewed, with 
regard to implementation, procedures, and the impacts on prices and supplies. It updates a previous 
publication of the same title dated August 1984. New policy concepts included in the 1985 farm bill 
or discussed in the debate surrounding its enactment are added. In addition, a new section has been 
added that recognizes the important role of credit policy as a dimension of farm policy. The 
international section has been strengthened. The macroeconomic tools (monetary and fiscal policy) 
were eliminated as a result of feedback suggesting they were too general to be useful. In the next 
edition or in a separate publication a macroeconomic section will be developed which includes 
alternative federal income tax and monetary policy tools. The purpose of this publication is not to 
advocate particular farm programs or policies, but rather to summarize the array of techniques and 
methods which have been utilized or considered for improving economic equity and stability in 
agriculture. This publication should be a useful guide and reference for those individuals or 
organizations involved in agricultural and food policy development, for those considering the 
broader domestic and internati.onal dimensions of U.S. agriculture, or for those interested in policy 
alternatives that could be used singularly or combined. 
Keywords: Domestic farm policy, commodity programs. international trade policy, market 
development programs, credit policy. 
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Introduction 
Agricultural policy is a broad term used to encompass government programs that directly affect the 
prices and incomes received by farmers. In developing agricultural policy, producers and 
agribusiness leaders, their organizations, and government policy makers must sort through a myriad 
of potential policy tools. 
Each policy tool or government program is intended to deal with a specific farm problem in a 
specific way. For example, target prices raise farm income through direct payments from the 
government while support prices raise income by setting a floor on market prices. Some policy 
tools are more effective than others in accomplishing the objectives for which they are intended. 
For example, quotas that dictate the volume a producer can market are more efficient than acreage 
reduction programs in controlling production. Often policy tools have side effects that need to be 
considered before selections are made. For example, when price supports are set above world 
market prices, exports fall. 
This publication provides brief descriptions of individual policy tools that are most directly related 
to agriculture and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The report is designed to be a 
comprehensive list of those policy tools that are used currently, have been used in the past, are used 
in other countries, or have been proposed for use in the United States. These tools are divided into 
four general categories: 
• Domestic farm programs-designed to raise or stabilize farm prices and incomes. 
• International trade policies-designed to create a more favorable trading environment 
for U.S. farm products. 
• l\1arketing programs-designed to improve farmers' position in domestic and foreign 
markets. 
• Credit programs-designed to assure agriculture an adequate supply of debt capital at a 
reasonable cost. 
A single-page summary describes each policy tool with respect to the following: 
• The policy area in which the tool falls. 
• \Vhat the policy tool is. 
• The primary objective of its use. 
• \\'hen it has been used. 
• Experience with ' its use. 
• Consequences of its use. 
The following publications offer comprehensive discussions of the policies described here. 
• Armbruster, W. J., D. R. Henderson, and R. D. Knutson. Federal Markeling Programs in 
AgriculLUre: Issues and Oplions. Danville: The Interstate Printers & Publishers, Inc. 
1983. 
• Christiansen, M. K., editor. Speaking of Trade: ILS Effect on AgriculLUre. Agricultural 
Extension Service, University of Minnesota, Special Report No. 72. 1978. 
• Gardner, B. L. The Governing of Agricullure. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas. 
1981. 
• Glaser, R. K. Provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985. USDA/ERS, Agr. Info. BuI. 
498, 1986. 
• Knutson, R. D., J. B. Penn, and \\T. T. Boehm. Agricullural and Food Policy. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1983. 
• Paarlberg, D. Farm and Food Policy: Issues of the 1980's. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. 1980. 
• Tweeten, L. Foundalions of Farm Policy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1979. 
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DOMESTIC F ARl\1 PROGRAMS 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\'hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Acreage Reduction, Set-Aside, and Diversion 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
Acreage reduction consists of an acreage set-aside and/or acreage diversion that is 
generally voluntary. Acreage set-aside programs require that participating 
farmers idle a percentage of their crop base acres to be eligible for other program 
benefits. Acreage diversion programs pay producers a given amount per acre to 
idle a percentage of their base acres. A farmer 's base acres are determined by 
the production history of the crop. 
To reduce the quantity produced and thus the suppJy of a given commodity. 
Acreage set-asides and diversions were used extensively during the 1960s and 
since 1977. These programs are generally used when prices are depressed due to 
a stock buildup. 
Acreage reduction programs have been only modestly effective in reducing 
supply over the long run. These programs have usually been used when high 
Joan rates, target prices, or temporarily high market prices encourage farmers to 
expand production. Program participation, normally a function of the level of 
producer benefits, has been particularly high for cotton , rice , and wheat during 
the 1980s. To encourage participation, diversion payment~ may be added to 
other farm program benefits. 
• To the extent that acreage reduction programs decrease production, they reduce 
supply and stocks and raise prices domestically. 
• Effective acreage reduction programs reduce the volume of supply available for 
export. 
• Slippage reduces the effectiveness of the program. (Slippage is that portion of 
reduced acreage which does not result in correspondingly lower production 
e.g., due to removing the poorest land.) 
• Diversion programs can result in large treasury outlays. 
• Payment limitations and offsetting compliance discourage participation by 
large-scale operators who farm large acreages for multiple landlords. 
• Failure to require cross compliance encourages producers to participate for one 
crop but not for others- reducing the effectiveness of the overall program. 
• Acreage reduction programs tend to restrict a farmer's ability to shift acreage 
in response to changes in relative crop prices. 
• Effective acreage reduction programs increase prices for commodities, cost of 
production for livestock producers, and food and fiber prices. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
l\1arketing Quotas 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
A marketing quota is a mandatory mechanism to determine the quantity of a 
commodity that can be marketed. The national quota, set by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, is based on expected domestic and export demands and is usually 
below normal production levels. Each producer is given a portion of the national 
quota based on past production. Certificates may be issued to producers holding 
quotas that give producers the right to market a given quantity of product. The 
certificate may have a value determined through market exchange. 
To restrict production by controlling the quantity farmers are allowed to market. 
Since marketing quotas are mandatory for all producers growing the quota crop, 
quotas must be approved by a referendum. Farmers historically have approved a 
quota only when a crisis existed. Quotas have generally been used in conjunction 
with allotments and relatively high price supports. Marketing quotas have been 
used regularly for peanuts and tobacco. The 1985 farm bill authorized the use of 
marketing quotas for wheat, which if proclaimed by the Secretary and approved 
in referendum by 60 percent of the eligible producers, would be put into effect 
for the 1987-90 crop years. 
Marketing quotas are the most effective means of controlling production. They 
were initially imposed after acreage allotments proved to be ineffective in 
controlling production. Marketing quotas have effectively reduced production 
and stock levels but only when the national quota was set at levels consistent with 
demand at politically acceptable prices. At the time of writing, the marketing 
quota authority contained in the 1985 farm bill had not been exercised by the 
Secretary. 
• Once a quota is in place, there is pressure to increase the national quota, thus 
counteracting its purpose. 
• Like other supply control programs, marketing quotas usually reduce the 
volume of exports for the quota crop. 
• Marketing quotas are more efficient in reducing supply and raising price than 
acreage reduction programs because there is almost zero slippage. 
• Marketing quotas are associated with low treasury costs unless the quota is so 
high that Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks accumulate. 
• Marketing quotas tend to acquire a value that reflects the capitalized added net 
returns producers receive from the program. This value may either be directly 
associated with the quota or, if tied to a land base, capitalized into the value of 
the land resulting in increased land prices. 
• Single crop marketing quotas for major crops (e.g., wheat) adversely affect 
prices of crops planted on the idled acres (e.g., corn and sorghum). 
• Increased prices for commodities increase cost of production for livestock 
producers and food prices over time. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Long-Term Land Retirement, Conservation Reserve Program 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
Long-term land retirement is a multiple year voluntary program that removes 
cropland from the production of farm commodities. Requirements are generally 
imposed which require that a soil-conserving cover crop, including trees , be 
planted. The government generally pays the landowner an annual rental rate 
plus a portion of the cost of establishing the cover crop. 
To remove from production cropland that is resulting in surpluses or is subject to 
erosion. 
The program was first authorized in the 1956 farm bill as the Soil Bank Program. 
In 1965 Congress re-established a land retirement program and called it the 
Cropland Adjustment Program. Funding was authorized for continuation of a 
long-term land retirement program in 1970. but was discontinued during the 
world food crisis of the 1970s. The 1985 farm bill contained authorization to 
retire up to 45 million acres of highly erosive land from production. Land 
retirement is politically acceptable to consumers and producers when surplus 
stocks and low prices are a chronic problem. If needed, the land can readil y be 
put back into production, as it was in the early 1970s. In the 1985 farm bill, 
farm organizations and environmentalists combined efforts to achieve the dual 
objectives of surplus control and soil conservation. 
Earlier land retirement programs removed large quantities of cropland from 
production. Cropland under long-term agreement was put into a conserving use 
(usually grassland or forestry). The least productive lands tended to be enrolled 
in the program. Because of the regional concentration of enrollment, the 
program was blamed for the demise of numerous rural communities. In 1985, 
sealed bids submitted by farmers owning eligible cropland were used to decide 
which land would be retired. This bidding process proved to be highly 
controversial. 
• Long-term land retirement is a supply control and conservation strategy that 
may cost less than paying storage and interest on surplus commodities. 
• Long-term land retirement programs can adversely affect local agribusiness and 
rural communities. 
• Increased prices for commodities increase production costs for livestock 
producers and food prices over time. 
• Land retirement can be used to encourage conservation of cropland, 
reforestation, and enhance wildlife preservation practices. 
• Long-term land retirement reduces farmers' flexibility. 
• Retired land, properly cared for, may result in greater productivity when put 
back into use. 
• Slippage is generally high because the least productive land is removed from 
production. Slippage may be reduced somewhat if whole farms are removed 
from production. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Dair)1 Buyout, Termination Program, and Diversion Program 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
The dairy buyout program (termination program) paid dairy farmers to slaughter 
or export their cows and discontinue milking operations for at least 5 years. 
Farmers submit competitive bids in a buyout program. In the diversion program, 
the government paid farmers $10/cwt of base production to reduce production by 
slaughter, reduced feeding, or modified breeding schedules. 
To reduce milk production, control stocks, and cut government costs. 
The dairy diversion program was first used in 1984 after dairy program costs 
exceeded $2 billion annually and the government was purchasing over 10 percent 
of the milk supply. The buyout program was initiated in 1986 after the diversion 
program proved unsuccessful at reducing production. 
The diversion program was less than 50 percent effective at reducing production. 
Participation was highest in those states which were already decreasing 
production. Nonparticipants reacted by increasing production. After the 
program ended, production sharply increased to record levels. The maximum bid 
accepted in the dairy buyout program ($22.50/cwt over 5 years) was more than 
twice as high as the diversion program. Evidence of cow trading to circumvent 
the intent of the program was extensive. Branding of cows destined for slaughter 
or export was objected to by animal rights advocates. Beef producers sought 
legal remedies to assure beef prices would not be unduly depressed. 
• Slippage proved to be at least as big a problem in dairy as in crops-acres 
cannot move at night but cows can. 
• Participation was highest in those regions having the lowest returns over 
variable costs. 
• Farmers who were contemplating going out of business anyway were most 
likely to participate. 
• Buyouts and/or diversions create strong incentives for nonparticipants to 
increase production. As a result, production declines tend to be temporary. 
• Diversion and/or buyout programs, without price support reduction, do not 
create long-term incentives to reduce production. 
• Increased dairy slaughter raises beef supply and depresses meat prices. 
• Animal rights activists become very concerned about branding and the 
conditions surrounding the animal slaughter. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Acreage Allotment 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
Acreage allotment is a mandatory mechanism to reduce the quantity supplied . 
Acreage allotments require that producers plant within a specified number of 
acres. The number of acres alloted to each farm is set at a given percentage of 
the farm 's production history. The percentage is based on the national 
allotments estimated to meet supply objectives. 
To reduce the quantity produced and thus the supply of a given commodity. 
Acreage allotments were used extensively during the 1950s and 19605 for the 
basic commodities. Allotments still exist for tobacco. Allotments have also been 
used as a means of allocating target price benefits (e.g., with rice from 1976-81) . 
When acreage allotments were used in the absence of marketing quotas , farmers 
responded by farming the allotted acreage more intensely, thus increasing yields. 
The result was a tendency for production to return to pre-allotment levels, 
therefore necessitating further restrictions on allotment size. In some 
commodities, such as tobacco, marketing quotas were imposed to more effectively 
control production. 
• Acreage allotments raise domestic prices by reducing production and supply. 
• Benefits from acreage allotment programs are bid into the price of land and/or 
the allotments. 
• High cash outlays to purchase allotments act as a barrier to entry for young 
farmers. 
• Acreage allotments restrict the ability of farmers to change their crop mix in 
response to changes in relative crop prices. 
• When allotments are imposed on one crop, surpluses may arise in other crops 
as farmers use non-allotment acres to produce other crops. Thus allotments 
are often imposed on those additional crops. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Cross-Compliance, Limited Cross-Compliance 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
A provision requiring a farm to be in compliance with the terms and conditions 
of all other commodity programs applicable to the farm as a condition of 
program eligibility for any single commodity. For example, if a farm produced 
two program crops, cotton and wheat, the farm could not be in compliance and 
receive benefits from the wheat program without also meeting the program 
requirements for cotton. Limited cross-compliance differs from cross-compliance 
in that a producer does not have to abide by the acreage reduction requirements 
for other program crops in the farm , but cannot plant in excess of the established 
crop acreage base for the other crops. 
Cross-compliance has multiple objectives including: reducing production , 
reducing government program expenditures, and reducing a commodity 
program 's adverse impacts on other commodities. 
Strict cross-compliance provisions have not been enforced since the 1960s. 
Limited cross-compliance authority was implemented in the late 1970s and is 
currently authorized in the 1985 farm bill. 
While theoretically cross-compliance is essential to implementing an effective 
acreage reduction program for agriculture in general (across crops), farmers and 
their organizations have strongly resisted the implementation of 
cross-compliance. Even though the 1985 farm bill specifically mandated limited 
cross-compliance, Congress was forced to modify these provisions in "technical 
amendments" to make cross-compliance an optional decision for the Secretary. 
• The cross compliance provision improves effectiveness of production controls 
across program commodities. 
• The provision prevents spillover of surplus acreages and resources to other 
program commodities. 
• Cross-compliance has the potential for reducing government cost. 
• Implementation of the provision can result in less program participation, 
especially if payment limits are a constraint. 
• Cross-compliance is strongly resisted by farmers and their organizations. 
• Cross-compliance restricts a farmer 's ability to shift acreage in response to 
changes in relative crop prices. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Offsetting Compliance 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
A farm program provision requiring each producer to be in compliance with the 
program terms for the same crop on all farms as a condition of program 
eligibility. For example, if a farmer produced corn on three farms he would have 
to meet the terms and conditions of the corn program on each farm before being 
eligible for any corn program benefits. 
To aid in production control and reduce government program expenditures. 
Offsetting compliance provisions were used as recently as the late 1970s. The 
1985 farm bill allows the Secretary, at least implicitly, the authority to require 
offsetting compliance in wheat and feedgrains. The bill explicitly prohibits 
offsetting compliance provisions from being used in cotton and rice. 
\Vhile theoretically offsetting compliance is essential to implementing effective 
acreage reduction programs, it is not politically or pragmatically attractive. 
Politically, as in the case with cross-compliance, farmers and their organizations 
have strongly resisted offsetting compliance. Pragmatically, the multiple 
landlord-tenant relationships that exist throughout commercial agriculture make 
equitable implementation of this provision virtually impossible. 
• The provision improves effectiveness of production controls within a 
commodity. 
• Offsetting compliance has the potential for reducing government cost. 
• Implementation can result in less program participation, especially if payment 
limits are a constraint. 
• Offsetting compliance is strongly resisted by farmers and their organizations. 
• Offsetting compliance restricts a farmer's ability to shift acreage in response to 
changes in relative crop prices. 
• The provision is difficult to implement with multiple landlord-tenant 
relationships. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\Vhen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Payment in Kind (PIK) 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control, Price and Income Support 
PIK is an acreage diversion program with the diversion payment in the form of a 
commodity rather than in cash. In-kind payments may also be used in lieu of 
deficiency or other government payments as a means of price and income 
support. 
To reduce both production and stocks of commodities in the farmer owned 
reserve (FOR) and in the CCC loan and/or to reduce direct treasury outlays 
(government costs). 
PIK was used in the early 1960s for 1 year; in 1983 for wheat, cotton, corn, 
sorghum, and rice; and again in 1984 for wheat. The 1985 farm bill authorized 
the use of PIK to pay for the cost of virtually any program (14 different 
programs by one count). The program has been used when government 
controlled stocks reach such unacceptably high levels that a PIK program is 
feasible. 
PIK is one way to reduce stocks controlled by the government and the cost of 
government storage. Problems occur when the government is required to pay 
out more PIK commodity than it owns, as was the case for cotton and rice in 
1983. An attempt was made to resolve many of the logistics problems incurred 
in early PIK programs by issuing generic PIK certificates under the 1985 farm 
program (see generic PIK). A decision that PIK commodities were not subject to 
the payment limit encouraged participation of large volume producers. In 
addition, PIK certificates are not subject to budget cuts under Gramm-Rudman. 
• PIK provides an off-budget method for paying producers to divert cropland. 
• PIK reduces government owned stocks. 
• PIK helps maintain market supplies while curtailing production resulting in a 
price stabilizing effect. 
• Program effectiveness in increasing prices depends on farmer participation , 
slippage, and initial level of stocks. 
• PIK increases the marketable supplies when it is released from CCC stocks or 
loan. 
• Local communities, agribusiness firms , and livestock producers are adversely 
affected by PIK production control programs if sign up is high. 
• Instead of adjusting excess resources out of crop production, PIK's artificially 
high prices may actually encourage them to stay. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
\Alhat It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Generic PIK 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control, Price and Income Support 
A negotiable commodity certificate which can be redeemed by the holder for his 
farmer-owned loan, any uncommitted commodities in CCC inventories , or cash. 
The certificates are issued to complying producers in lieu of cash payments for a 
variety of provisions in the 1985 farm bill. The certificate is issued for a dollar 
amount, therefore , the amount of commodity which can be redeemed is 
determined by the daily redemption price as determined by the CCC. The 
negotiability of the certificate allows for the sale and resale of the certificate up 
to its stated expiration date. 
To improve on the economic and logistical problems encountered in earlier PIK 
programs which were applied to individual commodities available only in 
designated locations. 
First implemented in the 1986 farm programs after the 1985 farm bill ; 
substantially expanded the authority for PIK. 
Negotiable commodity certificates are not tied to a specific location or CCC 
commodity. The program offers more flexibility than past PIK programs. The 
negotiable aspect of the generic certificate allows market forces to dictate the 
allocation of commodities currently in CCC inventories. The market forces were 
evident early in the 1986 program implementation as generic certificates were 
being purchased at prices exceeding their par value. 
• Generic certificates may be used in lieu of cash for a variety of the programs to 
be initiated in the 1985 farm bill. Multiple expiration dates can become 
confusing. 
• Flexibility as to commodity and location allows producers operating in 
traditional surplus-producing regions to benefit pricewise at the expense of 
producers in deficit regions. 
• Market prices tend to weaken as commodities are released from government 
inventories. 
• Generic certificates offer considerable flexibility for the seller and buyer and 
thus may result in bids in excess of par value. 
• The provision allows an off-budget mechanism for the release of many CCC 
held inventories. 
• Since certificates are generic, increased incentives to participate in one 
program, for example cotton, may have an adverse impact on the market 
prices for an alternate commodity, for example dairy products, if market 
forces dictate the release of that commodity. This cross-commodity price 
impact has not received a lot of public attention, but may induce program 
restrictions in the future. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used : 
Experience: 
Conseq uen ces: 
Sodbuster, Swampbuster 
Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
Sodbuster makes new, highly erodible lands brought into production ineligible for 
farm program benefits. Swampbuster denies program benefits for wetlands 
brought into production. Provisions in the 1985 farm bill indicate that a 
producer would be ineligible to participate in the farm program for existing 
cropland if fragile land is brought into crop production. Prior to the 1985 farm 
bill only new land put into crop production was excluded from the farm 
program. 
To discourage the breakout of new fragile lands for agricultural production . 
Enacted as a provision of the 1985 farm bill with the support of both 
environmentalists and farm organizations. 
Not used over sufficient time period to draw conclusions, however, research 
suggests that the 1985 farm bill provisions could bring a halt to clearing and 
draining of fragile lands by producers who currently participate in the farm 
program. 
• Sod buster and swampbuster discourage new lands from being brought into 
production in the face of surpluses as a result of high price and/or income 
supports . 
• The provision conserves land and water resources. 
• Sodbuster and swampbuster prevent further buildup of surplus production . 
• The provision restricts increases in the supply of crop land, thus supporting 
prices of land in production. 
• The provision reduces current values of affected land that could be brought 
into crop production. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Loan, Nonrecourse Loan 
Domestic Farm Programs, Price Support 
The CCC makes nonrecourse loans at established loan rates to farmers for wheat, 
feed grains, cotton, sugar , wool, tobacco , and honey. The loan, plus interest and 
storage, can be repaid within 9 to 12 months and the commodity sold'~ on the cash 
market. If it is not profitable for the farmer to repay the loan , the CCC has no 
recourse but to accept the commodity in full payment of the loan. Commodity 
loans, therefore , are frequently referred to as a price support, since national 
season average prices generally do not fall below set loan levels . Local prices, on 
the other hand , can fall below the loan rate for part of the marketing year. 
To add price stability to the market by releasing CCC stocks when prices were 
high and withdrawing stocks from the market when prices were low. A second 
objective was to encourage orderly marketing of commodi.ties throughout the 
marketing year by preventing a market glut at harvest. 
The CCC loan program has existed continuously since 1938 for cotton, wheat, 
and feedgrains. During World \Var II , the loan rates for basic commodities were 
set at 100 percent of parity to encourage production of crops already in surplus. 
In other years, the loan rates were set low to avoid encouraging production. 
CCC loans were effective at stabilizing prices of feed grains during the 1960s 
when the price of corn was bounded by the loan rate and the CCC release price 
(110 percent of loan). At various times political pressure has caused loan rates to 
be set above equilibrium market prices; as a result (a) the loan rates acted as a 
supply incentive for producers, (b) the CCC acquired large stocks of grains and 
cotton, and (c) the volume of exports declined as commodities were priced out of 
the world market. As a result of these effects, the marketing loan (see next tool) 
was authorized in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1985. In addition, loan rates 
are to be established for 1987-90 based on a moving average formula of previous 
prices. The formula was included in the 1985 farm bill to keep loan rates 
competitive with world prices. 
• Loan rates with reasonable release levels act as a price stabilizing force in the 
market and thus reduce price risk for producers leading to greater production. 
• The CCC loan program extends the marketing period for producers 9 to 12 
months , even longer with extensions. 
• The CCC loan reduces price risk for farmers thus encouraging excess resources 
to remain in agriculture. 
• High loan rates can effectively price U.S. commodities out of the world market 
necessitating an export subsidy or direct aid to export surplus CCC stocks. 
• Loan rates based on the cost of production tend to increase without regard to 
the market clearing price and thus can become a production incentive. 
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Polic)' Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Commodity Purchase Program 
Domestic Farm Programs, Price and Income Support, Demand 
Expansion and Assistance 
Gives the CCC, acting through the Secretary of Agriculture, the authority to 
purchase commodities for government storage and/or distribution. 
To support the price of commodities. 
Market purchases of commodities occur regularly under the operation of the 
price support programs for commodities such as butter. nonfat dry milk, and 
cheese. Regular purchases of commodities in surplus also occur in association 
with commodity distribution and school lunch programs. Special purchases have 
been mandated in particular instances such as to remove excess supplies of meat 
from the market during the dairy buyout program. Prior to elections, special 
purchases of products such as corn have been made to support prices. 
Commodities purchased under special programs (other than price support 
program purchases) are generally those having the greatest political muscle . The 
program is frequently used to achieve specific political ends and/or to alleviate 
temporary surplus conditions. Commodity purchases are generally not effective 
in dealing with long-run surplus conditions or price suppression. Government 
commodity give-aways under the welfare program have largely been replaced by 
food stamps. 
• Increased purchases temporarily raise market prices. 
• When purchased commodities are distributed, commercial sales of the 
commodity are reduced. 
• Storage costs for commodities purchased are very high unless rapidly 
distri b u ted . 
• Related processing industries such as packers or milk processors are frequently 
important beneficiaries. 
• Government commodity give aways were plagued with inequities, fraud, and 
corruption. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
\\'hat It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) 
Domestic Farm Programs, Price Support 
The FOR is a 3-year CCC loan for wheat and feed grains. The 1977 farm bill 
established the FOR as a 3-year extension of the CCC loan after time expires in 
the regular loan. Reserve stocks remain in the producers hands until the 
Secretary of Agriculture authorizes release or the extension expires. 
To stabilize grain prices and provide producers a longer time period to sell their 
grain. A secondary objective was to establish a food reserve of grains, thus 
stabilizing grain supplies and making the United States a more dependable 
supplier. 
The FOR has been in use since 1978 for wheat and feedgrains. The program w,as 
modified in 1980 to allow direct entry, thus avoiding the regular CCC loan. In 
addition, producers were given a direct entry loan price higher than the regular 
loan rate in 1980, 1981, and 1982. Stocks in the reserve are eligible for release 
when cash prices reach a level determined in advance by the Secretary of 
Agriculture. 
The FOR attracts large quantities of stocks when the entry price is set above the 
equilibrium market price. Since its inception in 1977, corn prices have reached 
the FOR release level twice. \\Then that happened, corn stocks were released and 
prices stabilized at the release level. Research has shown that the FOR reduces 
the quantity of stocks held by the private sector and causes season average prices 
to be at either the entry price or the release price depending on the 
supply-demand balance. 
• FOR often results in the accumulation of stocks which in turn result in 
substantial storage and interest costs. 
• FOR provides farmers 3 years to market their grain out of the reserve at the 
release level price. 
• Political pressure groups attempt to set the FOR entry price above equilibrium 
market price, thus creating, in effect, an income support program. 
• In the face of declining export demand, there are no provisions to reduce the 
FOR entry or release price. 
• FOR works best when there is a relative supply-demand balance, thus allowing 
prices to move in a range between the entry loan rate and the release price. 
• High loan levels and release prices encourage U.S. and foreign production and 
discourage U.S. exports. 
• FOR supports prices only when producer participation is high and adequate 
storage is available. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
l\1arketing Loan, Findley Loan, and l\1arketing Certificates 
Domestic Farm Programs, Price and Income Support, Demand 
Expansion and Food Assistance 
Marketing loan is a nonrecourse loan with a repayment rate which may be less 
than the announced loan rate. The difference between the loan rate and the 
repayment rate is treated as an unlimited income support payment to producers. 
The payment is referred to as the Findley loan payment. The repayment rate is 
generally some percentage of the loan rate or the world market price. Marketing 
certification can be issued to first handlers if repayment levels continue above 
world market price. 
To provide flexibility for the price support loan rate and, thereby, reduce 
interference of the regular nonrecourse loan with competitive price levels. 
Marketing loans were first authorized in the 1985 farm bill. While authorized 
for all commodities, marketing loans, repaid at the world price, were only 
implemented in rice . On other commodities loan rate reductions at 20 percent of 
the regular loan rate were implemented. The cotton and rice programs for 1986 
call for the use of marketing certificates equal to the difference between the 
repayment level and world price when needed to remain competitive. 
\Vith high levels of government stocks, market prices fell to the repayment level. 
Whereas rice exports were extremely low in 1985 without the marketing loan, in 
1986 stocks appeared to move into commercial channels. Foreign country 
competitors objected 'strongly to increased price competition from U.S. 
commodities in world markets. Participation of large farms in acreage reduction 
programs increased sharply. 
• Marketing loan repayment rates become the market floor price when not used 
in conjunction with marketing certificates. 
• Prices become more unstable. 
• Commodities become available for export at competitive world prices, thus 
increasing expons. 
• Without a payment limit on the difference between the loan and the repayment 
rate, large farms have greater incentive to participate in the program. 
• Government costs increase sharply in the presence of large surplus stocks. 
• Competing exporting countries' farm program costs increase and/or their 
producer returns decline. 
• Domestic users gain access to U.S. commodities at world competitive prices. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\'hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Target Prices, Deficiency Payments 
Domestic Farm Policy, Income Support 
In the United States, deficiency payments are paid to farmers to make up the 
difference between a price determined to achieve a politically accep~able income 
level (target price) and the higher of the average market price or the loan rate . 
Deficiency payments are made on each farm's actual planted acres and farm 
program yield. The farm program yield is based on each farm's yield history. 
Target prices were set initially to reflect an average cost of production. 
Deficiency payments were initiated to raise and stabilize farmer incomes to the 
level of the nonfarm population, while allowing farm prices to be competitive in 
the export market. 
Target prices were authorized for cotton in 1970 and for cotton, wheat, corn , 
sorghum, and oats in the 1973 farm bill. Deficiency payments are paid on 
eligible crops if the average cash price is less than the target price. The 1985 
farm bill added the marketing loan and/or Findley loan provisions which 
separated the deficiency payment into two components: (1) the difference 
between the target price and the loan rate which is subject to the payment limit, 
and (2) the difference between the regular loan rate and the repayment rate 
which is not subject to the payment limit (see marketing loan and payment 
limits). 
Initially, target prices were set to reflect changes in the cost of production and 
yield. Much debate ensued over what constituted the cost of production. A 1977 
change in the target price formula removed the possibility of reducing target 
prices to reflect yield increases. The 1981 farm program set target prices for 
cotton, wheat, and corn for 1982-85 without regard to inflation, crop yields, or 
production costs. Excess production and high government costs resulted. The 
1985 farm bill calls for a reduction in target prices by 1990. Large government 
payments resulting from the marketing and Findley loan reductions resulted in 
much publicity and controversy. 
• Target prices set above market clearing levels stimulate production, reduce 
market prices, and thereby reduce food and feed costs. 
• By reducing market prices, target prices allow U. S. farm products to be more 
competitive in the world market while supporting farm income, e.g., an 
implicit export subsidy. This is a major advantage over support prices for 
raising producer income. 
• Setting target prices above the expected market price can result in large 
Treasury outlays. 
• Deficiency payments provide income support up to $50,000 to large-scale 
producers and little support to small-scale operators because payments are 
based on production. 
• Deficiency payments reduce income risk for producers and increase their 
ability to obtain financing; 
• Deficiency payments resulting from the marketing and Findley loan can lead to 
large government payments overall and to individual farmers. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used : 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Disaster Program 
Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
Low yield and prevented plantings payments are paid to producers who, through 
no fault of their own , are unable to plant their crop or harvest a normal yield. 
To reduce yield and planting risk faced by producers by providing them a 
relatively free (program compliance necessary) crop insurance program. 
Disaster payments were first authorized by the 1973 farm bill. Disaster payment 
benefits were available from 1973-81 to producers who were in compliance with 
other program provisions. Low yield payments were made to producers who 
were prevented from harvesting less than 66 percent (75 percent for cotton) of 
their normal yield. In 1982, the provisions of the disaster program were 
dropped , except fo r extreme emergencies, to reduce government costs and 
encourage participation in the federal multi-peril crop insurance (FCIC). 
Disaster programs were very expensive and encouraged expanded production of 
crops in high risk areas. Low yield and prevented plantings payments were 
received mainly by dryland producers in the Great Plains and producers in the 
Delta States. 
• High treasury costs are associated with disaster programs. 
• Disaster programs provide producers income assistance when they need it the 
most, namely , after a natural disaster. 
• Availability of the 'disaster program increases producer participation in 
voluntary acreage reduction programs. 
• Disaster programs encourages the production of high risk crops in low rainfall 
and floodplain areas. 
• In latter years, disaster payments were subject to a $100,000 payment 
limitation , thus discouraging program participation by large-scale operators. 
• Benefits from the program are bid into the market value of marginally 
productive. high-risk cropland. 
• The disaster program transfers production risk from producers to taxpayers. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Payment Limit 
Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
Payment limits set a maximum on the amount of deficiency payments and/or 
disaster payments that a person can receive from the government. 
~7 
To limit the level of government benefits received by a single farmer, and to 
reduce the image of farmers becoming wealthy from farm programs. 
With the establishment of direct payments to farmers in the late 1960s questions 
arose as to the magnitude of benefits received by large scale farms , 
predominantly rice, wheat, and cotton. As a result of this controversy, the 1970 
farm bill set the payment limit at $55,000. In 1973 the limit was reduced to 
$20,000, after which it was escalated to $40,000 in 1977 and subsequently to 
$50,000. The 1985 farm bill payment limit remains at $50,000 with the 
emergency disaster program limited to $100,000. However, the marketing and 
Findley loan removed the limit on subsidies below the regular loan rate (see 
marketing loan and target prices) . 
As the difference between the target price and the loan rate has widened, an 
increasingly large number of farmers have become subject to the payment limit. 
The combination of pressures to reduce government costs by more strict 
enforcement of the payment limit combined with more farmers becoming subject 
to the limit has made payment limits more controversial. At the same time, 
farmer efforts to find legal loopholes in payment limit regulations have 
accelerated. The marketing and Findley loan materially reduced the controversy 
surrounding the payment limit. 
• Strict enforcement of the payment limit reduces large-scale farmers ' incentives 
to participate in farm programs. 
• The wider the difference between the target price and the loan rate , the greater 
the number of farmers who are adversely affected by the payment limit. 
• A larger number of farmers affected by the payment limit was one of the 
factors leading to the marketing loan provisions. 
• Acreage reduction programs are less effective at reducing supply in the 
presence of payment limits. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Federal 1\1ulti-Peril Crop Insurance (FCIC) 
Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
FCIC is a subsidized low-yield insurance program for farmers. 
To provide federally subsidized crop insurance to producers unable to obtain 
adequate crop insurance on their own; also to replace the low-yield and 
prevented plantings disaster program for grains and cotton with an insurance 
program available to all producers of major crops. 
FCIC for wheat was first authorized under the 1938 Federal Crop Insurance Act. 
Federal crop insurance was available only for wheat from 1938 through 1941 
when it was expanded to cotton. The program was suspended in 1943 because of 
low producer participation but revived in 1945 with a reduction in counties 
insured. After 1948 the program was extended to more counties and crops, 
including vegetables and fruits. The program was substantially modified in the 
1980 farm bill to provide a 30-percent federal cost subsidy. In 1981 the program 
was expanded to all counties in the United States and to most major crops. 
Federal crop insurance has not garnered high levels of producer participation. 
Participation has been the highest in high-risk, nonirrigated, low-rainfall areas. 
Problems have been encountered in developing an actuarially sound premium 
structure and in adequately marketing the program to producers. Experience 
indicates FCIC has a high cost of administration relative to commercial 
insurance. 
• Limited acceptance by farmers leads to adverse loss experience and political 
pressure for disaster payments. 
• Low participation by producers results in high loss ratios and high Treasury 
costs. 
• The program provides more extensive coverage than commercial hail insurance 
at subsidized rates. 
• High premiums discourage widespread producer participation and low 
participation requires high premiums to make the program actuarially sound. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
""hat It Is: 
Objective: 
""hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Income Insurance 
Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
Income insurance would involve an expansion of the FCIC all-risk crop insurance 
to include both yield and price risk, i.e., total crop receipts. 
To stabilize farm incomes from the adverse effects of natural disasters and low 
prices and thus replace all supply control and price support programs with a 
comprehensive farm income insurance program. 
An income insurance program for farmers has not been used in the United 
States. The 1981 farm bill authorized an investigation into the feasibility of a 
federally subsidized income insurance program for farmers. 
None 
• An actuarially sound farm income insurance program may reduce current 
Treasury outlays but, 'as with FCIC, such a program would be difficult to 
develop. 
• Producers' premiums would likely be unacceptably high, and since the policy 
replaces a "free" risk protection program, producers would likely oppose the 
program. 
• Participation by farmers would likely be very low, like federal crop insurance. 
• Political pressure to reduce premiums below their actuarially sound levels 
would be substantial. Premiums set too low would lead to excessive 
government costs and could cause the program to act as a supply incentive 
even in the face of surpluses. 
• The program could be flexible enough to be used for both expanding and 
contracting supplies and for Shifting production (acreage) from one crop to 
another. 
• The program could discourage production in high risk areas. 
• Research indicates that the high correlation between crop prices and yields 
among regions would cause the program to fail since losses caused by either 
low yields or low prices would be widespread and catastrophic for the 
Treasury. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Cost-Sharing Programs, Assessment Programs 
Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
A cost-sharing or assessment program is a means by which the costs of farm 
programs are shared between producers and the government. The producers' 
share of the cost is covered through an assessment per unit of product marketed. 
The magnitude of the assessment per unit depends on the degree of cost sharing 
(50-percent cost sharing would involve a higher checkoff than if producers shared 
only 30 percent of the cost) and the size of the commodity surplus. The higher 
the assessment, the lower the effective level of price or income support for the 
commodity. 
To make the level of income support more responsive to the magnitude of the 
surplus and to help defray a portion of government program costs. 
The 1981 farm bill provided a cost-sharing program for tobacco. A 1982 farm 
bill amendment provided for a cost-sharing program in dairy. For both tobacco 
and milk, cost-sharing programs were implemented only after a serious political 
threat that the whole government price support program for these commodities 
might be withdrawn. The dairy cost-sharing program was reinstated in the 1985 
farm bill to pay for a portion of the costs of the dairy buyout program (see dairy 
buyout). In the case of the dairy buyout, producers who continue to produce 
milk are taxed to cover a portion of the costs for the buyout program. 
Producer resistance has been substantial to the "tax" ·under each program. 
Tobacco cost sharing was eliminated in the 1985 farm bill. Dairymen chose an 
even higher assessment to avoid price support cuts that would have been imposed 
by Gramm-Rudman. With high government costs for virtually all commodity 
programs, producer cost sharing could be a required feature of future farm policy 
legislation. 
• The cost-sharing concept provides an automatic adjustment to the level of 
income support for farmers as government expenditures rise. 
• The political hassle of adjusting income support downward when supports are 
initially set too high is avoided. 
• The assessment reduces government costs and, thereby, increases the political 
acceptability of farm programs by urban congressmen and taxpayers. 
• The assessment makes the level of income support more responsive to market 
forces. 
• The assessment puts the burden of program costs on producers whereas a price 
support reduction puts the burden on cooperatives, processors and exporters 
who traditionally hold inventories. 
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROGRAMS 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
GATT is a multilateral United Nations treaty among more than 80 governments, 
including the United States. GATT contains a code of principles and provides a 
forum for consultation and dispute settlement. Five principles govern GATT: 
1. Trade must be nondiscriminatory. 
2. Domestic industries should be protected by tariffs as opposed to 
nontariff barriers (quotas). 
3. Tariffs agreed upon are binding, with provision for compensation if 
violated. 
4. Consultations are provided to settle disputes. 
5. GATT procedures may be waived on agreement of the members with 
provision for compensation. Barriers in existence when GAIT was 
established (1947) are legal until negotiated away. 
To liberalize and expand trade among nations through negotiated reductions in 
trade barriers. These actions are designed to prevent the development of rounds 
of retaliatory trade barriers. 
GATT carne into existence October 30, 1947. Trade barrier reductions have been 
accomplished in three rounds of negotiation - the Dillon Round (1960-61), which 
provided for European Economic Community (EEC) duty-free entrance for 
soybeans and cotton; the Kennedy Round (1963-67), which resulted in tariff 
reductions on a wide range of farm products; and the Tokyo Round (1973-79), 
which reduced non tariff barriers on a limited number of commodities. A new 
round of negotiation is expected to begin in late 1986. Agriculture is sure to be a 
central focus of this new round of trade negotiation, with the contribution of 
domestic farm programs to the erection of trade barriers being the focal point of 
attention. Major topics to be discussed are the further reduction in agricultural 
trade barriers and subsidies. Trade in services and preservation of intellectual 
property rights will also be topics of discussion. 
While experiencing initial success, the most difficult problems that remain in 
securing trade barrier reductions are those rooted in the domestic farm policies 
of the participating countries. Classic examples include the EEC Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the aggressive trade stance in the 1985 farm bill. 
• GAIT increased overall trade among nations, thus expanding opportunities for 
exports. 
• GAIT provides a forum for settling disputes. 
• GAIT establishes a code of fair trade. 
• GAIT restricts the latitude of participating countries in subsidizing exports and 
engaging in other practices. Thus in the short run GATT places participants 
at a disadvantage. 
• It is difficult to enforce the GATT principles against the major country· 
members. 
• GAIT has been more effective at reducing trade barriers in industrial products 
than in agriculture due to the problems created by domestic farm programs. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\Then Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
The GSP is a program permitting duty-free entry of certain imports ~rom 
designated developing countries. . 
To assist in economic development, encourage diversification, and expand 
production of certain developing countries. 
Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 sets forth criteria for country and product 
eligibility as well as for limitations on preferential treatment. Developing 
countries not eligible for GSP include communist countries, the developing 
country which extends preferential treatment to the products of a competing 
developed country , most OPEC countries. countries that nationalize U.S. 
property without compensation. countries that do not cooperate in narcotic 
control , or countries that have aided international terrorism. Import-sensitive 
articles or commodities such as textiles are excluded from GSP. 
Developing countries purchase over one-third of all agricultural exports and have 
been the fastest growing market for farm products. GSP has helped developing 
countries to buy U.S. products~ although U.S. producers of some commodities 
have been adversely affected. 
• GSP expands developing country exports to the United States. 
• GSP increases economic growth in developing countries. 
• GSP increases export earnings for developing countries so they can import 
more. 
• GSP helps in maintaining favorable foreign relations with free world 
developing countries. 
• GSP is a low cost means of providing aid to developing countries. 
• GSP adversely impacts U.S. farmers who produce the commodities extended 
preferential import treatment. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used : 
Experience: 
Conseq uences: 
l\1onetary Export Subsidies 
International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
Monetary subsidies to exporters in dollars per unit of commodity sold. 
To make the U.S. commodity price competitive in the world market and thus 
expand markets. 
Export subsidies can be used to export agricultural commodities when U.S. price 
supports are above world prices. Overt monetary subsidies of exports are seldom 
made because they clearly violate the provisions of GAIT. Under those 
provisions the United States could be required to pay damages to the countries 
injured by such subsidies. EEC subsidies do not violate GATT since they were in 
place as a part of CAP at the time GATT was negotiated. The last major U.S. 
direct monetary export subsidy was in the 1972 Russian grain deal when a 
subsidy of approximately $0.60 per bushel of wheat was provided. The 
marketing certificate program authorized for cotton and rice in the 1985 farm 
bill are similar to an export subsidy (see marketing loan). Political considerations 
are obviously involved in the use of export subsidies. 
Export subsidies are overt methods of subsidizing exports. As such, they are 
readily determined to be in violation of GAIT and invite retaliation from 
competitors if they increase U.S. market share. 
• The effective export price is lowered to make U.S. commodity prices 
competitive in the world market. The result is to expand exports. 
• Domestic farm prices may be increased. 
• Monetary subsidies run a high risk of inviting retaliation. 
• Monetary subsidies violate GAIT. 
• CCC stocks are reduced as a result of increased exports. 
• Long-run price relief is provided for U.S. producers in the face of low world 
prices. 
• Monetary subsidies can be expensive in terms of both money and image. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
'A'hat It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Two-Price Plan 
International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
A two-price plan discriminates between the domestic and the foreigl} market by 
charging a higher price for domestic sales than for foreign sales. Exports are, 
therefore, indirectly subsidized by the higher domestic price. 
To raise the level of producer returns while preventing the accumulation of large 
surplus commodity stocks. 
Before 'A'orld War II and the negotiation of GATT, two-price plans were used 
extensively to support farm income. Since the negotiation of GATT, the 
operation of two-price plans in the United States has been restricted largely to 
marketing orders and peanuts. 
Two-price plans, in essence, make the world market a residual and less profitable 
market. Advocating reduced trade barriers and operating two-price plans are 
obviously inconsistent. 
• Producer income increases if the demand in the domestic market is more price 
responsive than in the export market. 
• Surplus stocks do not accumulate in the face of high domestic price supports. 
• Lower export market prices create the potential for price warring conditions. 
• The world market tends to become unprofitable when two-price plans are used 
extensi vel y. 
• Controversial methods of being competitive would draw public media attention. 
• Domestic market is placed at a disadvantage relative to the foreign buyers. 
• Import restrictions are necessary to prevent the reimportation of the lower 
priced foreign sales or processed products mq.de from the sales (see import 
quotas). 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Blended Credit 
International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
Blended credit is a non-price form of export subsidy which combines direct 
government export credit and credit guarantees in a single package to reduce the 
effective interest rate. Government export credit is provided in a program 
known as GSM-S. The credit guarantee program is known as GSM-102. 
To make U.S. credit terms competitive with those offered by other exporting 
countries. 
Blended credit is available only when appropriations are provided by the 
Congress. Tight budgets have made blended credit available only to a limited 
number of countries and commodities. Countries are selected based on 
magnitude of surpluses and competitive need, as well as diplomatic and domestic 
political considerations. The blended credit program was most recently initiated 
in October 1982. 
During the period used, blended credit facilitated the opening of markets for U.S. 
commodities in competition with other countries. It is particularly useful for 
those developing country markets where credit and credit guarantees are critical. 
• The United States is made more competitive in the face of other countries' 
subsidized export credit programs. 
• A basis is provided for penetrating new export markets- particularly in 
developing country markets. 
• Compared to other forms of export subsidies, blended credit runs less risk of 
creating retaliatory trade war conditions. 
• Expansion of subsidized credit encourages other countries to expand their 
export subsidy programs, thus creating the potential for increased treasury cost 
over time. 
• If successful in expanding exports, blended credit raises prices in the United 
States thus raising domestic food costs and production costs for livestock 
producers. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\Then Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Direct Export Credit 
International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
Direct export credit refers to the CCC GSM-5 program which provides financing 
for U.S. agricultural exports with terms up to 36 months. 
To provide financing to countries and/or foreign buyers unable to secure credit 
and without which the sale of U.S. agricultural commodities w'ould not be made. 
The GSM-5 program was used extensively through the period 1956-1979. Since 
the beginning of the GSM-102 credit guarantee program in 1980. much less focus 
has been placed on the direct credit program. In the 1985 farm bill , no funds 
were authorized for the GSM-5 program. 
Since 1956, the GSM-5 program has been responsible for the export sales of 
between $1.4 million to $1.6 billion annually of U.S. agricultural commodities. 
Beginning with the GSM-102 credit guarantee program in 1980, the GSM-5 
program declined in importance. In 1985, $325 million was authorized for 
GSM-5 while $5 billion went to GSM-102. For 1986 and beyond, no funding was 
allocated for GSM-5 in the 1985 farm bill. As a result those sales that would not 
have been made otherwise will be lost. 
• U.S. markets in countries with severe debt problems have been maintained. 
• Government costs are higher than they would be without program funding. 
• Credit guarantee programs are needed to compete with similar programs 
offered by other exporting countries. 
• A basis for expanding markets in developing countries is provided. 
• If credit sales expand total exports, domestic food costs and livestock 
production costs are greater than they would be without the programs. 
28 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Export Credit Guarantees 
International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
Export credit guarantees are U.S. government assurances for U.S. banks which 
provide financing for foreign buyers to purchase U.S. agricultural products. The 
CCC insures up to 98 percent of the freight on board (f.o.b.) value of an export 
sale in the event that a foreign bank fails to make payment, for any reason, under 
a letter of credit agreement. 
To assist U.S. exporters in making sales they would not make otherwise and to 
compete with export enhancement programs provided by other exporters. 
Export credit guarantees were introduced in 1979 and have been an integral part 
of U.S. agricultural trade policy ever since. The 1985 farm bill continues 
authorization for the GS!\1-102 program with credit terms up to 3 years. It 
further provides funding for an intermediate credit program, GSM-301, which 
provides credit terms of between 3 to 10 years and includes financing for 
infrastructure. Previously only one project, a grain silo in Israel (1980), had been 
undertaken. 
The only credit guarantee program currently in operation, GSM-I02, has been 
successful in maintaining U.S. sales to countries with severe debt problems. This 
success has occured only through continued increase in federal appropriations, 
increasing from $671 million in 1980 to authorization for up to $5 billion 
annually through 1990. 
• U.S. agricultural exports have declined less than they would have in the absence 
of such programs. 
• Long-term developments of markets are promoted. 
• U.S. exporters are more competitive with programs of other exporters. 
• Export credit guarantees are less obvious than other export subsidies and less 
likely to produce retaliation from other exporters. 
• Export credit guarantees decrease government direct credit budget exposure. 
• Export credit guarantees allow U.S. banks to make loans which would not be 
financially prudent under ordinary circumstances. 
• Export credit guarantees may expose the U.S. government to large liabilities in 
the event of major defaults by foreign purchasers. 
29 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\' hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Public Law (P.L.) 480 (Food for Peace) 
International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
P.L. 480 provides for concessional sales of commodities that contain substantial 
U.S. subsidies. Exports are made under three P.L. 480 programs: 
• Title I involves sales for dollars under low interest rates with up to 40 
years repayment. 
• Title II involves emergency food relief directed to nutritionally 
vulnerable groups. 
• Title III involves commodity aid as part of a development package. 
Multiyear commitments are tied to specific development actions. 
To dispose of surplus commodities. develop markets , provide emergency food 
aid, and assist friendly nations in development. 
Authorized by the Agricultural Trade Development Act of 1954, P.L. 480 was 
used to export as much as one-third of the export sales during the 1950s and 
1960s when loan rates were generally maintained above world prices. Since then 
P.L. 480 sales have generally been in the $1 to 2 billion range. Countries are 
selected for assistance based on diplomatic and political considerations as well as 
need. Commodities selected are influenced by the magnitude of surplus stocks. 
The Secretary of State makes the final decision on who gets P.L. 480 aid . 
P.L. 480 is credited with having built such important commercial markets for 
farm products as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and Spain . The need to get 
commodities moving through P.L. 480 is frequently frustrated by foreign policy 
considerations. 
• A government alternative to exports is provided when the United States is not 
price competitive in the world market. 
• Commodity aid is combined with development assistance, thus being more 
politically acceptable. 
• Government stocks of commodities are reduced. 
• Long-term development of markets is promoted. 
• P.L. 480 provides the State Department with a diplomatic tool that can be used 
in foreign policy negotiations. 
• P.L. 480 sales may displace commercial sales. 
• Assistance in alleviating hunger and starvation is provided. 
• Too much commodity aid can be a disincentive for production in developing 
countries and can make them overly dependent on imports. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Export PIK, Bonus Incentive Commodity Export Program (BICEP) 
International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
Under export PIK. the government provides an in-kind export commodity bonus 
for each regular commercial purchase of a specified amount. For example, if a 
country purchases 1 million metric tons of wheat, it might receive an additional 
100,000 metric tons of PIK wheat from CCC stocks. The 100,000 metric ton 
bonus is the export PIK. 
To make the United States commodity price competitive in the world market and 
thus expand export markets. 
Export PIK was first used in a 1983 flour sale to Egypt. The 1985 farm bill 
contains provisions for export PIK to support both targeted export assistance 
programs and export market enhancement programs. In general, the use of 
export PIK is limited to those surplus commodities held in CCC inventories. 
Export PIK was used to virtually captu're the 1983 Egyptian flour market for the 
United States. Other flour exporting countries, such as France, were upset, 
although no overt retaliatory steps were taken against the United States. Recent 
activity has continued to focus on wheat and flour sales in the North African 
regions. In addition CCC soybean and corn stocks have been used to subsidize 
frozen poultry sales. 
• The United States is competitive in the world market, despite reduced demand 
and loan rates that may be above world market clearing levels. 
• Export PIK is less overt than direct monetary export subsidies and thus not as 
likely to invite either retaliation or GATT sanction. 
• Government stocks of commodities are reduced. 
• An export alternative is provided by export PIK as long as the CCC owns 
sufficient stocks. 
• Export PIK is a violation of at least the spirit of GATT. 
• \Videspread use of export PIK could invite public image problems and 
undermine the GATT negotiations. 
• Commercial sales may be offset by bonus commodities. 
• Increased demand for export PIK subsidized commodities places upward price 
pressure on domestic consumers. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Import Quotas 
International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
Import quotas limit the quantity of an individual commodity imported. Limits 
are generally allocated among potential exporting countries. Specific· limits are 
frequently negotiated to avoid more restrictive voluntary or mandatory limits. 
The specific size of quotas may be either legislated, negotiated, or determined by 
executive action. Those determined by executive action under Section 22, as 
interfering with the operation of a price support program, are recommended by 
the International Trade Commission and imposed by the President. 
To establish a maximum quantity of specific commodities which can be imported 
and, thereby, protect U.S. producers and/or price support programs from foreign 
competition. 
Beef import quotas have been mandated by the Congress. Cheese import quotas, 
imposed to protect the price support program. have been the subject of 
negotiation and agreement under GATT. Import quotas are also imposed on 
sugar and related products. Import quotas exist on te:>..1:ile imports as a means of 
avoiding harm to the domestic textile industry. 
The imposition of import quotas is highly political. Even though the 
International Trade Commission recommendations to the President are based on 
objective criteria, the ultimate Presidential decision is highly political. The 
existence of U.S. import quotas has made it difficult to get other countries to 
reduce trade barriers. Japan argues that its beef import quotas are no different 
from the beef import quotas of the United States. 
• Import quotas restrict available supplies and raise domestic prices. 
• Textile import restrictions reduce export demand for U.S. cotton lint but may 
increase sales to domestic mills. Less overall demand is likely because of 
higher ultimate consumer product prices. 
• Without import quotas on price supported commodities, the CCC would 
acquire a larger quantity of commodities under the price support program. 
• Import quotas result in windfall profits to licensed importers. 
• Supply control aspects of import quotas result in greater price fluctuations than 
would occur in a free market. 
• Efficiency of production plays no role in determining competitiveness under a 
system of quotas. 
• Retaliation for non-agricultural commodity quotas can lead to reduction in 
agricultural exports from the United States. 
• Import quotas established by large importing countries (European Community, 
United States, Japan) tend to depress world prices. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\'hen Used: 
Experience: 
Conseq uences: 
Import Tariffs, Countervailing Duties 
International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
Import tariffs are a tax or duty on commodities entering the United States. A 
countervailing duty is a tariff that offsets an export subsidy of another country. 
A tariff may be either a fixed charge per unit of product imported (specific 
tariff) or a percentage of the value of the product imported (ad valorem tariff). 
The specific size of the tariff may be legislated, negotiated, or determined by 
executive action. The size of the countervailing duty is designed to exactly offset 
the size of the export subsidy of a competing country. 
To restrict imports of certain commodities and, in the past, to generate tax 
revenues. 
Because of the emphasis of GATT on reducing tariff trade barriers, their 
importance has gradually decreased. Substantial tariffs, however, exist on a 
number of specialty commodities. The authority exists for the imposition of 
countervailing duties equal to the amount of export subsidies provided by other 
countries. Such countervailing duties are generally limited to those instances 
where there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is 
being materially injured or threatened with injury because of subsidized imports. 
Antidumping duties may also be imposed if a commodity is sold in the United 
States at less than fair value in the event of a finding of material injury. 
Countervailing duty and antidumping duty actions involve determinations by 
both the International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce. 
The visibility of tariffs and GATT emphasis on reducing tariff trade barriers have 
fostered the tlse of nontariff barriers to trade. Tariff barriers are less effective in 
reducing trade because they do not constitute an absolute limit on quantities that 
can be imported. That is, while efficiency plays no role in import quotas, tariffs 
potentially continue to reward efficiency. Tariffs were used to raise the price of 
imports and thus prevent their interfering with domestic price support programs 
and depressing U.S. prices. There has been a hesitancy to utilize countervailing 
duties because of the potential for precipitating trade wars. 
• Tariffs raise the effective price of goods entering the United States and thereby 
reduce the comparative advantage of foreign produced goods. 
• Tariffs reduce the volume of commodities imported at all price levels. 
• Economists regard tariffs as a lesser evil than quotas or other nontariff barriers 
because with a tariff efficient producers may still be able to obtain access to 
the market. 
• Countervailing or antidumping duties offset export subsidy practices of other 
countries and, thereby, protect U.S. producers. 
• The U.S. Treasury receives the revenue from a tariff. 
• The absolute quantity of price fluctuation is the same or nearly the same with a 
tariff as in the free market. Price changes are reflected to consumers. 
• Import tariffs may result in retaliation by trading partners. 
• On tariff regulated commodities, consumers in the importing country pay 
higher prices than in the absence of tariffs. 
• Import tariffs established by large importing countries (European Community, 
United States, Japan) tend to depress world prices. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Nontariff Trade Barrier 
International Trade Programs, Domestic Industr)1 Protection 
Nontariff trade barriers, strictly speaking, cover all restrictions on imports other 
than tariffs. Thus, quotas are nontariff trade barriers. Likewise, the variable levy 
(tariff) employed by the ECC in CAP is a nontariff trade barrier. For a 
discussion of these policy tools, see import quotas and variable levy. The 
nontariff barriers discussed here include a wide array of devices such as health 
and sanitation, packing, packaging. and labeling regulations, as well as foreign 
exchange restrictions. 
To restrict imports of certain commodities. 
The use of nontariff trade barriers has increased, in part because of the GATT 
emphasis on reducing tariff trade barriers. The most common U.S. nontariff 
restrictions relate to health and sanitation restrictions such as the prohibition of 
meat imports from countries having foot and mouth disease. Sometimes such 
restrictions are justified. while at other times they are purely protectionist. 
Nontariff trade barriers are generally more restrictive than tariff barriers since 
they may constitute absolute barriers to trade. Nontariff barriers have had a 
tendency to proliferate in recent years. Nontariff barriers have been used to 
reduce the competitiveness of foreign producers who are able to use pesticides 
and other products that are banned in the United States. 
• Nontariff trade barriers restrict available supplies and raise domestic prices . 
•• Nontariff trade barriers may be an absolute barrier to trade with efficiency 
playing no role in determining competitiveness. 
• The imposition of a nontariff barrier may increase the degree of price 
variability. 
• Nontariff trade barriers increase the risk faced by importing firms. 
• Nontariff trade barriers may result in retaliation by trading partners. 
• Nontariff trade barriers may assure standardization and product quality of 
imported goods. 
• Nontariff trade barriers tend to depress world prices when used by large 
importing countries. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
\\That It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Voluntary Export Restraint 
International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
An agreement whereby foreign governments are asked to limit exports of specific 
commodities to a given quantity. Often the agreements are negotiated under 
duress because of the potential inactment of formal import restrictions. 
To control the importation of certain commodities thereby protecting domestic 
producers. 
In the United States, voluntary export restraints are used in conjunction with the 
Meat Import Act of 1979. Whenever USDA estimates of meat imports appear 
likely to exceed 110 percent of the adjusted base quantity, the U.S. government 
has negotiated voluntary restraints rather than impose and administer formal 
import quotas. 
The voluntary export restraint mechanism has served as a useful adjunct to 
formal import quotas authorized by the Meat Import Act. 
• Voluntary export restraints restrict available supplies and raise domestic prices. 
• Greater price fluctuations in world markets result from voluntary export 
restraints than would occur in a free market environment. 
• Voluntary export restraints erode the importance of efficiency of production in 
determining competitiveness. 
• Income derived from holding import license or quota is transferred to 
exporting country. 
• Some countries may be left out of the market because they refuse to limit their 
imports. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\Vhen Used : 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Variable Levy 
International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
A minimum price is set at which a commodity can be imported. If the import 
price falls below that minimum price, a levy or import tax is imposed ~qual to 
the difference between the world price and the import price. A variable levy is 
classified as a nontariff trade barrier because the size of the levy (or tariff) is not 
fixed in either absolute or percentage terms. 
To control importation of specific commodities. 
The variable levy is the principal protectionist tool used by the ECC. Under 
CAP the EEC farmers are guaranteed a feedgrain price greater than the world 
price. An import levy equal to the difference between the EEC producer price 
and the price of grain landed in Rotterdam must be paid on imported grain. 
The variable levy is an effective barrier to trade because it eliminates the 
economic (price) advantage of the imported commodity. Efforts to negotiate a 
less restrictive EEC agricultural policy have failed because the variable levy is the 
very basis of CAP. Getting rid of the variable levy would mean that the EEC 
would have to develop a whole new agricultural policy approach. 
• A variable levy effectively reduces imports and thus raises domestic prices to a 
predetermined level. 
• Efficiency plays no role in determining competitiveness under a variable levy 
policy. 
• The variable levy constitutes a source of revenue to the importing country, 
when the world price is below the predetermined minimum price. 
• The variable levy ensures a stable internal price while increasing instability in 
world markets. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Cargo Preference 
International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
Cargo preference refers to the provision of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 
which requires that a portion of cargoes procured, furnished, or financed by the 
United States be transported in U.S. ships. Under the requirements at least 50 
percent of P.L. 480 shipments must be transported in U.S. vessels. The 1985 
farm bill provides for an increase in the tonnage requirements by 10 percent in 
1986, 20 percent in 1987, and 25 percent each year thereafter, contingent on 
funding from the Department of Transportation. 
To provide a minimum volume of business to the the U.S . maritime industry. 
Cargo preference requirements have been an important factor in U.S. agricultural 
exports since the enactment of P.L. 480 in 1954. 
Cargo preference has had a major impact on agricultural food aid programs of 
P.L. 480. Transporting commodities aboard U.S. vessels costs between 1.5 to 2.5 
times more than for foreign vessels. This increased cost is paid for out of USDA 
funding for P.L. 480, some $150 million in 1985. In 1985, a federal court ruling 
that cargo preference also applied to USDA blended credit programs resulted in 
suspension of the program because the increased transport cost made the 
program no longer cost effective. 
• U.S. food aid assistance programs are able to deliver less commodities than 
would otherwise be possible with the same funding levels. 
• U.S. agricultural exports are less competitive due to curtailment of certain 
credit programs as a result of increased transport costs. 
• U.S. maritime industry receives subsidies in excess of $100 million per year. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\' hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Export Embargoes 
International Trade Programs, Embargoes 
Export embargoes set absolute limits on quantities that can be exported. Partial 
embargoes may allow only a certain quantity to be exported after whic~ 
permission must be obtained from the exporting country. ,. 
To hold down U.S. commodity prices, to prevent shortages of commodities, to 
achieve a foreign policy objective, or any combination of the above . 
Since 1970 export embargoes have been imposed three times: 
(1) In 1973 an embargo was placed on the export of soybeans to provide 
assurance that poultry and hog producers would have a sufficient lower cost 
supply of soybean meal. 
(2) In 1975 an embargo was placed on exports of grain sales to the Soviet Union 
after concern about increasing food prices. 
(3) In January 1980 an embargo was placed on all exports to the Soviet Union 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent tensions in 
Poland. This embargo was not lifted until April 1981. 
Provisions of the 1985 farm bill continue protection for producers against the 
imposition of export embargoes by assuring direct payments for compensation to 
producers of affected commodities. 
Embargoes or the threat of embargoes have been a major factor in reduced 
confidence in the United States as a dependable supplier. Therefore, embargoes 
have contributed to the decline in the U.S. share of world agricultural trade. 
Serious questions also exist concerning the effectiveness of embargoes as a policy 
tool. 
• Embargoes reduce U.S. export sales and lower prices. 
• Embargoes reduce confidence in the United States as a dependable supplier, 
thus, encouraging foreign buyers to cultivate other sources of supply. 
• Embargoes encourage other countries to increase production as a means of 
achieving self-sufficiency. 
• Embargoes encourage exporting countries to increase production. 
• It is difficult to prevent the intended embargoed country from importing the 
commodity from another source. 
• The mere potential for embargoes is reflected in the market place as exporters 
and importers adjust for this uncertainty. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Sanctity of Contracts 
International Trade Programs, Embargoes 
Sanctity of contracts provides that exporters will be able to fulfill their contract 
obligations for a period of 270 days after the imposition of any embargo. 
Sanctity of contract provisions were included as an amendment to the commodity 
futures trading commission bill in 1983. 
To assure importing countries the United States is a dependable supplier and to 
reduce the impact of export embargoes on exporting firms and producers. 
After lifting the Soviet grain embargo in April 1981, producer organizations and 
exporting firms applied increasing pressure on the Reagan administration for 
sanctity of contracts. In 1982 President Reagan provided assurance that he would 
allow increased purchases by the Soviets with sanctity of contracts. This principle 
was written into law in early 1983 and applies to all agricultural export sales. 
This assurance is continued in the 1985 farm bill. 
The abrupt imposition of the Russian grain embargo in January 1980 left U.S. 
producers and exporters with delivery commitments that were disallowed. While 
the U.S. government provided compensation to exporters for losses incurred, 
long-term injury ensued to the reputation of the United States as a reliable 
agricultural exporter. This was one of several factors leading to a decline in the 
U.S. share of total world trade in the early 1980s. 
• The United States is viewed as a more reliable supplier of agricultural exports. 
• Importers know that when they sign a contract for delivery of U.S. agricultural 
products, there will not be governmental interference with performance on it. 
• Exporters are assured their sales will be allowed. 
• Producers are shielded from the immediate effects of embargoes. 
• Producers should receive higher prices, since exporters do not have to discount 
for the uncertainty posed by a potential embargo. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Long-Term Bilateral Trade Agreements 
International Trade Programs, Trade Agreements 
A long-term bilateral trade agreement is a contract between two countries 
specifying the quantity of a commodity to be traded over a certain time period. 
Bilateral trade agreements normally run for a period of 3 to 5 years, although 
they may be simple I-year agreements that are renewed annually. The 
agreements normally specify the minimum quantity to be purchased and the 
maximum quantity to be supplied. Generally no provisions exist with regard to 
the price to be paid. 
To assure the importing country a minimum supply and the exporting country a 
market for its production, and to normalize trade, develop markets, and retain 
markets for farm products. 
Trade agreements have become increasingly common since a world food shortage 
was experienced in the early 1970s. The most publicized agreement was the 
5-year contract negotiated with the Soviets in 1975 which contained an agreement 
to purchase a minimum of 6 million metric tons of grain with the United States 
agreeing to supply at least 8 million metric tons. In the early 1980s the United 
States became cool to the trade agreement concept while Australia and Canada 
signed agreements with several countries including the Soviet Union and China. 
In 1983, the Reagan administration changed policy and renegotiated a new 
long-term trade agreement with the Soviets requiring annual purchases of 
between 9 and 12 million metric tons of grain. 
Trade agreements are a means of opening a new market on a long-term basis. 
The quantities specified in the agreement have generally been less than the 
normal trading levels. Due in part to increased domestic production, abundant 
world supplies, and various extra-agricultural policy disputes, both China and the 
Soviet Union have recently failed to live up to their contracts. 
• The total volume of trade tends to be increased and stabilized between the 
parties to the agreement. 
• Importing countries outside of the agreement may be denied a source of the 
commodity if supplies become short. 
• Exporting countries outside of the agreement may be denied market outlets 
when supplies are plentiful. 
• Trade agreements are, in essence, barriers to trade in that they tie up markets 
over long time periods. 
• Trade agreements cause greater fluctuations in world prices since they 
effectively reduce the world supply which can be competitively traded. 
• Trade agreements are difficult, if not impossible, to enforce and may lead to 
false market expectations. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
International Commodity Agreements 
International Trade Programs, Trade Agreements 
An jnternational commodity agreement is a multilateral agreement among 
countries to affect the terms of trade. The terms of trade affected by an 
international commodity agreement may include the price level, quantity sold, 
quantity produced, or quantity held in reserve. Legally, commodity agreements 
are treaties among the participating nations. 
To raise the world price above equilibrium levels, to stabilize price, and to 
provide increased supply assurance. 
Commodity agreements have been used most extensively on wheat, being first 
established in 1949. Currently they are used extensively among developing 
countries on commodities ranging from tin to sugar and coffee. OPEC might 
also be looked upon as an international commodity agreement. 
Commodity agreements have had a reasonably good history of stabilizing prices 
as long as burdensome surpluses or shortages do not exist. Commodity 
agreements designed to raise prices have a tendency to fall apart because of a 
lack of control over production. To be effective, commodity agreements require 
close coordination of domestic farm programs with the activities of international 
commodity agreements. 
• Commodity agreements provide increased price stability. 
• Domestic prices are ' raised by commodity agreements. 
• Exchange of information among countries on market conditions is increased. 
• \\Then prices are raised, excess supplies frequently accumulate unless effective 
supply control mechanisms are included. 
• Unless commodity agreements are well coordinated with the domestic farm 
programs of the participating countries, they tend to break down. 
• As with any international trade agreement, enforcement is virtually impossible. 
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Polic)' Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Barter/Counter Trade 
International Trade Programs, Trade Agreements 
Barter is trade among two or more countries or firms involving the exchange of 
goods andlor services of equal value instead of currency or credit transactions as 
payment for a commodity. 
To facilitate trade with developing countries experiencing short-run financial 
difficulties and to obtain sources to strategic raw materials that might not 
otherwise be available. 
The exchange of powdered milk to Jamaica for bauxite in 1982 was the first 
barter negotiation in 15 years. The 1985 farm bill requires the Secretary of 
Agriculture to establish and carry out at least two pilot barter programs by 1987. 
Agricultural commodities are to be bartered for designated strategic materials. 
Barter has a limited ability to expand exports. Rather, it is more of a temporary 
measure to maintain an existing market during periods of adverse economic 
conditions. Its greatest potential appears to be as a market development tool for 
developing countries with mineral or strategic metals of importance to the U.S. 
defense and industrial sectors. The biggest problem in barter is matching needs 
with products. 
• Barter helps maintain export levels. 
• Barter provides increased potential for developing commercial markets for 
agricultural products. 
• Barter has limited applicability because of the required coincidence of need. 
• Barter may displace commercial sales. 
• Barter value generally approximates relative world market value of the 
commodities bartered. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\'hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Commodity Distribution 
l\iarketing Programs, Demand Expansion and Food Assistance 
Commodity distribution programs provide primarily staple food products direct 
from the government to needy households. Commodities provided are generally 
in surplus, although nonsurplus food products have been provided in times of 
high unemployment. Commodities are distributed to those households who 
qualify according to specific eligibility standards- normally participation in some 
welfare program or unemployed. 
To expand the demand for farm products, utilize surplus commodities, and 
improve nutrition of needy consumers. 
Commodity distribution was a forerunner of the food stamp program. Such 
direct distribution programs date back to the Great Depression era. However, 
even after widespread adoption of the food stamp program in the 1960s, 
commodity distribution has from time to time resurfaced either to dispose of 
surplus government stocks or to deal with problems of unemployment and 
poverty. The special cheese and butter distribution programs operating in the 
early to mid-1980s provide examples of such surplus disposal efforts. 
Commodity distribution programs are costly because of the necessary network of 
qualification, processing, storage transportation. and distribution systems. With 
the advent of food stamps in the 1960s, the direct distribution system was 
dismantled. In the 1980s when surpluses and unemployment reappeared~ 
pressure grew to once again distribute commodities- beginning with cheese. 
Rather than establishing a distribution system, the Reagan administration 
provided the commodities to volunteer welfare groups such as churches. It was 
found, however, that under this system many unqualified recipients received the 
products. Subsequently, government appropriations were provided to pay for at 
least a portion of the costs of distribution. 
• Product movement is expanded to the extent that the quantities given away 
exceed normal recipient consumption levels. Reduced expenditures for 
distributed products results in purchases of other foods and/or nonfood items. 
• The commodities given away displace retail sales of the commodities and their 
substitutes. If people are given commodities, they certainly will not buy them 
or the substitutes for them. Food processors and retailers thus tend to be 
opposed to direct distribution programs. 
• For commodities in surplus that are acquired under price support programs, 
such as dairy products, the government will end up actually purchasing more 
products to the extent that those receiving the products buy less of them 
through grocery stores. 
• Nutrition levels of recipients are improved to the extent of the nutritional value 
of the additional quantities or items consumed. 
44 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
School Lunch 
1\1arketing Programs, Demand Expansion and Food Assistance 
The school lunch program provides assistance to schools through direct 
commodity distribution, cash subsidies, and, at times, subsidies for the purchase 
of equipment. Over time this program has been expanded to encompass both 
breakfast and lunch. Free or subsidized meals are given to children from 
low-income households. 
To improve the nutritional levels of school-age children and assure that they have 
at least one nutritionally balanced meal on school days. 
The school lunch program has been in existence since the 1930s. Over time it 
has gradually put increasing emphasis on cash as opposed to commodity 
distribution. Schools have had increasing impact on the specific commodities 
obtained under the program. In the 1980s, the program fed nearly 30 million 
students at a federal cost of about $5 billion. 
The school lunch program began as a depression measure to support prices and 
to improve nutritional levels for all school children. From its inception through 
much of the 1960s, emphasis was placed on distributing surplus commodities in a 
nutritionally balanced relationship. Schools, however, gradually wanted more to 
say about what was received. In addition, increasing costs of in-school 
preparation, relative to institutional and fast-food preparation, led to increased 
pressure to provide a larger proportion of cash subsidies relative to commodities. 
The increasing cost of meals led to school lunch and breakfast subsidies being 
restricted to children from low-income households. One of the main problems 
with the program has been complaints about the quality of meals served. 
Pressure always exists to provide a larger proportion of cash assistance. 
• The demand for food used in the school lunch program is increased. 
• Nutritional levels of school-age children are increased-particularly of 
low-income households. 
• \Vhile commodities distributed are a less important proportion of the total food 
used, the school lunch program continues to provide an important outlet for 
surplus dairy products, meat, fruits! and vegetables. 
• The development of a large institutional food service sector designed to serve 
this very large program has been fostered. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Women, Infants, and Children (\VIC) Program 
Marketing Programs, Demand Expansion and Food Assistance 
The WIC program combines direct commodity distribution with nutrition 
education. Most WIC recipients probably are also on food stamps or aid to 
families with dependent children. Nutrition education programs teach the 
recipients how to combine commodities with food expenditure dollars most 
effectively to improve nutrition and family living standards. 
To provide low-income mothers with a complete assistance program designed to 
improve nutrition levels for the family as a whole. 
The WIC program began on an experimental basis in the early 1960s and has 
experienced almost continual expansion since. Participation in the program has a 
tendency to increase in times of recession and increased unemployment. 
Many of the recipients are single mothers with very low incomes and pre-school 
children. Although \VIC has been criticized for its predominantly unwed 
mothers constituency, studies demonstrate it to be one of the most effective 
programs in improving nutrition levels. This results largely from the 
combination of monetary, commodity, and nutrition education assistance. 
Attempts to discontinue the WIC program (as a cost reducing measure) have 
consistently failed under the weight of studies showing the positive impact on 
nutrition and resulting broad based "hunger lobby" support. 
• Nutrition education programs result in increased consumption of foods 
normally considered to be part of a nutritionally balanced diet - particularly 
poultry, milk, cereals, fruits, and vegetables. 
• Commodities distributed tend to be in surplus and/or have particular 
nutritional value. 
• Commodities distributed partially displace commercial retail sales of these 
products and their substitutes. 
• Overall recipient nutritional level is demonstrably improved. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Food Stamps 
l\iarketing Programs, Demand Expansion and Food Assistance 
The food stamp program provides eligible recipients with stamps having an 
equivalent cash value. Eligibility is determined on the basis of income levels in 
relation to established poverty guidelines. Level of assistance is based on a 
USDA "thrifty food budget" covering the cost of commodities needed to achieve 
a balanced diet. Higher levels of assistance are provided for lower incomes and 
larger family sizes. 
To provide income assistance for the purchase of food by low-income households 
and thereby expand the demand for food as well as improve nutritional levels of 
recipients. 
The food stamp program, while first used in the 1930s, began in earnest as a 
long-term food assistance program in the early 1960s and has since mushroomed 
to a social program with more than 20 million recipients and costing about $12 
billion in the early 1980s. Food manufacturers and retailers actively supported 
the conversion from direct commodity distribution to food stamps because food 
stamps do not displace commercial sales (see Commodity Distribution). 
The merits of the food stamp program have been extensively debated. Major 
concerns regarding the program involve who should be eligible, the level of 
assistance, the commodities allowed to be purchased with stamps, and the 
potential for program abuse. Among the advocates of change are some who 
would prefer going back to commodity distribution and others who would prefer 
giving recipients .cash (referred to as cashing out). Some advocate moving food 
stamps out of USDA. 
• Consumption of food is increased. The largest increases occur in the demand 
for meat, milk, and poultry. 
• Some farm-state congressmen argue that the food stamp program helps them to 
get farm legislation through the Congress because major farm bills with food 
program components invariably attract urban interest. 
• Nutritional levels of recipients are improved, although not as much as under 
such programs as WIC. 
• Food retailers realize direct benefits- particularly those in low-income 
neigh borhoods. 
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Polic)' Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Cashing Out, 'Velfare Reform 
l\1arketing Programs, Demand Expansion and Food Assistance 
Cashing out would provide food assistance in cash rather than commodities or 
food stamps. All food and income assistance programs would be consolidated 
into a single cash payment. ' 
To provide income assistance to low-income households. 
While cash has not yet been substituted for food stamps, over time there has 
been gradual but persistent movement in the direction of providing a larger 
proportion of cash, as opposed to commodity or food stamp, assistance: Food 
stamps were substituted for direct commodity distribution, and cash subsidies to 
schools have become increasingly important relative to commodities. 
Cash has provided schools greater flexibility in the ultimate use of the assistance. 
Thus it is argued to result in a greater increase in satisfaction. The cost of 
running several individual programs each having different eligibility standards 
has become increasingly high. There are those who believe that such 
consumer-oriented policy changes have come to so dominate USDA that 
producer-oriented programs have taken a back seat. 
• The total welfare bill would be reduced as program duplications are eliminated. 
• Food consumption would fall if the current equivalent level of cash assistance 
was provided. 
• Prices of surplus commodities would fluctuate more as government outlets for 
surplus commodities are reduced. 
• Food assistance programs would be moved out of USDA and would not be part 
of the farm bill deliberations, thus reducing the potential for obtaining urban 
support for farm programs. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Conseq uences: 
Foreign l\1arket Development, Cooperative Programs 
l\iarketing Programs, Demand Expansion and Food Assistance 
Foreign market development activities of the U.S. government involve assisting 
firms or producer organizations in selling products abroad. These programs, 
managed by the Foreign Agriculture Service (F AS) in the USDA, are planned, 
implemented, evaluated, and financed jointly by the F AS and the cooperator 
organizations. They emphasize market information and technical assistance in 
servicing the needs of importing countries to utilize products effectively, enhance 
buyer awareness, and educate consumers. Producer program costs are generally 
financed through a checkoff program on commodities sold (see also checkoff 
programs). 
To expand export demand for farm products. 
Foreign market development activities depend heavily on producer, processor, 
and handler initiative to develop and finance a joint F AS-industry cooperator 
program. While F AS through its agricultural counselors has a general 
responsibility to promote exports, the greatest effort is devoted to those products 
where cooperator programs exist. 
Cooperator programs that are well conceived and financed are effective at 
expanding the demand as long as the commodity is available at competitive 
prices. It is difficult, if not impossible, to expand export markets for U.S. farm 
products when our prices are higher than the world price. 
• The quantity of products exported is increased. 
• Increased producer understanding of international markets is developed. 
• Cost of operating the market development program is shared by a large 
number of producers, making it more cost effective (see also checkoff 
programs). 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Domestic l\1arket Development 
l\1arketing Programs, Demand Expansion and Food Assistance 
Domestic market development programs assist producers in raising funds 
required to carry out generic promotion and advertising programs . . In apdition, 
provision is made for refunds to producers desiring not to participate and audits 
of the use of funds (see also checkoff programs). Such programs are authorized 
on an individual commodity basis under either Congressional or state legislative 
authority. 
To expand the domestic demand for farm products. 
Domestic market development programs get started only on producer initiative. 
Producers have to be organized to obtain the checkoff legislation or marketing 
order programs needed to implement a market development program. Market 
development programs have been most extensive in milk, cotton, and oranges, 
although programs have existed also in wheat and potatoes. Several of the 
marketing orders contain provisions for the collection of funds needed for market 
development activities. 
Most producer domestic market development programs are generic- promoting 
the product in general as opp,?sed to a particular brand of the product. In a 
limited number of instances (e.g., cotton), significant resources are devoted to 
joint advertising-subsidizing the advertising of innovative new uses of the 
product even though it is branded. Research indicates brand promotion and joint 
advertising programs are more effective than generic advertising. 
• A well-conceived and well-researched producer-oriented advertising program 
has the potential for raising producer returns through demand expansion. 
• Promotion and advertising programs are high in cost and difficult to evaluate. 
• Promotion and advertising programs must be geared to the product available 
and the size of the market. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Checkoff Programs 
l\1arketing Programs, Demand Expansion and Food Assistance 
Checkoff programs deduct a given amount per unit of product marketed by the 
producer to finance market development or research programs. Such programs 
exist under either special individual commodity legislation or general authorizing 
legislation, such as marketing orders. Such legislation may allow for refunds. 
To finance foreign and domestic market development programs and research for 
basic commodities. 
Checkoff programs are used when the necessary legislation exists and the 
required majority of the producers approve it in a referendum. In special 
commodity legislation at the federal level , refund provisions have generally been 
required. Numerous states have enacted local checkoff programs to fund 
research and market development, e.g. , cottonseed checkoff to fund research on 
cotton varieties and rice checkoff based on acres planted to fund rice research. 
Voluntary checkoff programs have proved difficult to maintain. Mandatory 
checkoff programs with refund provisions have sometimes encountered problems 
with relatively high redemption experience. Congress has generally been 
unwilling to allow a mandatory program without refund provisions. 
• Well run programs increase the demand for particular products. Yet overall 
demand for food is probably not changed. Thus one commodity is expanding 
its demand at the expense of another. 
• If products such as milk and cotton are not promoted, they are not in a 
position to compete against soft drinks or synthetic fibers. 
• Without refund provisions, checkoff programs provide an equitable means of 
financing costly market development programs. 
• With refund provisions, checkoff programs offer the potential for inequities 
and a reduction in effectiveness. 
• Checkoff programs provide a continuous flow of funds to related commodity 
organizations and thus increase the effectiveness and/or political power of 
these organizations. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is : 
Objective: 
When Used : 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Cooperatives, Capper-Volstead 
l\iarketing Programs, l\'Iarket Organization and Control 
The Capper-Volstead Act gives producers the right to act together in marketing 
their products , therefore providing cooperatives limited exemption fro rr the 
antitrust laws. It prohibits cooperatives from undul y enhancing price, however. 
The Secretary of Agriculture is responsible for enforcing the provisions regarding 
undue price enhancement. 
To assist producers in jointly marketing their products by providing a means fo r 
increasing prices , lowering costs , stabilizing market flows , expanding markets, or 
improving communication . 
The Capper-Volstead exemption is limited to farmers and to marketing functions . 
Farmers are those involved in actual growing functions ; therefore , agribusiness 
corporate integrators are not farmers. Likewise, joint, otherwise illegal , activities 
between cooperatives and noncooperatives are not covered by the 
Capper-Volstead exemption. Marketing functions are interpreted broadly to 
include bargaining, information , pricing, processing, and so forth. Cooperatives 
appear to have virtually unlimited rights to merge with one another. They 
cannot, however , engage in predatory or coercive practices with regard to either 
members or nonmembers . 
Cooperatives have effectively organized to market their products in a number of 
ways. The cooperative market share is about 33 percent overall , but as high as 
65 percent of the market in milk , fruits for processing, and vegetables for 
processing. Cooperatives are most effective when they are integrated and there is 
a firm producer commitment to market through them. Marketing orders are 
frequentl y used to augment cooperative market power and influence. Proposals 
have been made to eliminate the Capper-Volstead exemption or to transfer it \0 
the Federal Trade Commission for enforcement. 
• Suspending provisions of the Capper-Volstead Act would render pricing 
activities among farmers a violation of the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
• Cooperatives have potential for raising producer returns if well organized, well 
managed, and producers have a commitment to market through the 
cooperative. 
• Cooperatives ' influence is frequentl y eroded by "free riders" who obtain the 
benefits of the cooperative but pay none of the costs. 
• Substantial producer investment is generally required for successful cooperative 
activity. 
• Cooperatives have been important to the functioning of marketing orders 
because cooperative members have been allowed to vote as a bloc. Orders 
augment cooperative market power. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
1\1arketing Orders 
1\1arketing Programs, 1\1arket Organization and Control 
Domestic Farm Programs, Price Support 
Marketing orders are joint industry - government programs regulating the 
quantity and/or quality of specified products entering the market channel. 
Marketing orders are authorized for specific commodities under the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreements Act of 1937. 
To create more orderly marketing conditions for farm products and thereby 
stabilize supplies, prices, and producer incomes. 
Marketing orders are available only for commodities designated in the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act. These include specific fruits, vegetables, 
nuts, and milk. Orders for fruits, vegetables, and nuts emphasize the 
establishment of minimum quality, grade, size, or maturity standards for products 
entering the market. Reserve pools exist for some commodities in which stocks 
are held over the marketing season or into the next marketing season. Milk 
prices are set by the marketing order in terms of the milk's end use. Higher 
prices are charged for milk used for fluid purposes. Orders are put into effect 
after a request is received from producers (generally a cooperative), a hearing is 
held, the Secretary of Agriculture concurs, and two-thirds of the affected 
producers approve in a referendum. The 1985 farm bill deviated from these 
procedures by virtually mandating changes in milk marketing order provisions. 
Marketing orders have been highly effective in stabilizing markets where they 
have been used. Over time, however, the Secretary of Agriculture has been less 
inclined to utilize orders as strict supply management tools. Emphasis has thus 
been placed on orderly marketing and price stabilization. Strict marketing quotas 
have been limited to minor commodities such as hops and peppermint. All 
marketing orders with market flow provisions are under attack by the Office of 
Management and Budget as well as consumer advocate groups. 
• The balance of market power is shifted from processors to producer 
cooperatives. Increased price stability is provided throughout the marketing 
season by strict marketing controls. 
• Commodities available for sale are of more uniform quality. 
• Commodities are more readily available throughout the year. 
• Producer prices are increased. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
\Vhat It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
l\1arketing Boards 
l\1arketing Programs, l\1arket Organization and Control 
International Trade Programs, Trade Agreements 
Domestic Farm Programs, Price Support 
A marketing board is a central government authority which directs the '~arketing 
of a commodity. Export management is the most frequently performed function 
of a marketing board. \Vith all exports centralized in a single government 
agency, producers give up the right to their commodities at harvest; all storage 
and marketing functions are managed by the government. Producers receive an 
advance on commodities delivered or stored on farm, with subsequent payments 
being made as marketing is completed. All producers receive the same price 
(pool price) adjusted for location and quality. Additional farm program 
provisions, such as minimum return to producers, may also be provided through 
the marketing board. 
To raise and stabilize producer prices as well as offset the superior market power 
of commodity buyers. 
Marketing boards have never been used in the United States. They are used 
extensively in Canada, Australia, and South Africa. 
Evidence of the impact of marketing boards on producer prices and incomes is 
mixed, with some showing higher returns and others not. Boards do, however, 
provide inct-eased price and income stability to the producer, since the producer 
is shielded from the effects of within-year price fluctuation. While boards are 
frequently credited with providing strict control over production, their record is 
considerally less impressive_ 
• \Vithin-year producer price and income risk would be reduced. 
• The marketing and pricing function would be removed from the producer. 
• Much of the profit opportunities from handling and storing grain would be 
eliminated. 
• The infl uence of major exporting and marketing firms on commodity prices 
would be reduced. 
• The role of government in marketing would be substantially increased. 
• The United States would be better able to compete against state traders for 
export sales. 
• If adopted by the United States, the continued existence of viable futures and 
options markets would be questionable. 
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Policy Tools: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
l\1arket News Price Reporting 
Marketing Programs, l\1arket Facilitators 
Market news provides daily information on prices in spot or cash markets for 
farm prod ucts. 
To improve the quality and quantity of information on market activity available 
to farmers and agribusiness firms and thereby make market conditions more 
competitive. 
Authority for market news extends back to World \\'ar I. 
Market news has been in a continuous state of modernization and improvement 
since it was established. Market news increasingly finds itself competing with 
private information sources such as Urner-Barry and the Yellow Sheet. These 
private reports are used extensively in formula pricing. Private reports have been 
the subject of much debate over accuracy and reliability, while USDA reports 
have been subject to questions of timeliness, accuracy, and statistical reliability. 
Proposals have been made to transfer all market news functions to the private 
sector. Considerable controversy surrounds USDA's unwillingness to report 
contract terms for products such as broilers. 
• Market news provides increased equality of price information among producers 
and agribusiness firms. 
• Market news is of greatest benefit to small and middle size farm firms because 
they cannot afford private sources of information. 
• Market news acts as a public check on private sources of market information. 
• Market news is even more useful with increasing numbers of vertical 
integration and forward contracts which reduce price information in the 
market. 
• Government cost cutting measures raise the question of what market news 
users should pay for price information. 
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Policy Tools: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Crop and Livestock Production Reports 
l\1arketing Programs, Market Facilitators 
Crop and livestock production reports provide detailed estimates (predictions) of 
crop production from before planting (intentions) through harvest. 
'. 
To improve the quality and quantity of available information on production 
prospects and thereby make markets more competitive. 
Crop and livestock production reports have their origin in a series of laws 
enacted between World War I and the late 1940s. They are used by the private 
sector as an aid to production and marketing decisions, by economists to forecast , 
and by government officials to develop policy and aid in program decisions. 
The USDA's goal is estimates within 1 or 2 percent of actual production. Its 
record in achieving this degree of accuracy has been outstanding. USDA crop 
reports are frequently charged with having the effect of lowering farm prices. A 
bias one way or the other is impossible to confirm. Extensive steps are taken to 
protect the integrity of the reports. Government cost cutting measures have 
reduced the quantity (and maybe the quality) of available information. Efforts to 
charge for access to crop and production reports have come under considerable 
fire. 
• Crop and livestock reports make markets more competitive. 
• Without crop and livestock reports, this information would be available only to 
those firms that can afford this service from private information sources. This 
would be mainly agribusiness firms and large-scale farmers. 
• Crop and livestock reports increase the accuracy of both public and private 
sector economic outlook and situation analysis. 
• Crop and livestock reports are needed for informed policy decisions. They 
provide the data base on which economic analyses are conducted. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
\\'hat It Is: 
Objective: 
\\' hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Export Sales Reporting 
1\iarketing Programs, 1\iarket Facilitators 
The USDA presently requires that export sales involving more than 100,000 MT 
of major grains and oilseeds be reported to the USDA within 24 hours of sale. 
For other commodities, weekly reports are required. 
To provide information for the government to use in developing export policies 
and programs, to provide producers with information to help in their marketing 
decisions, and to improve performance of U.S. commodity markets by making 
timely information on export sales transactions available to the public. 
Following the impacts of the unanticipated large grain sales to the USSR in 1972, 
the government instituted the export sales reporting system in September 1973 
under Section 812 of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. It 
has been in operation since that time. Modifications to the system were made in 
1980 to shorten the public reporting lags of 11 to 18 days to approximately 7 to 
14 days. 
The export sales reporting system has had moderate success in achieving its goal 
of increased access to timely information. The system still suffers from 
substantial lag time in reporting information and limited detail on contract 
specifics. A number of alternatives, including specific contract terms and 
prenotification, have been considered. 
• Overall quality and quantity of information concerning export transactions is 
increased. 
• USDA is provided with prior warning of sales that could jeopardize supplies 
available in the United States. 
• More information on supplies reduces the probability of an embargo resulting 
from commodity shortages. 
• Prices are more responsive to export market conditions. 
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Policy Tools: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Grades and Standards 
l\-larketing Programs, l\1arket Facilitators 
Grades and standards classify units of a commodity according to quality so the 
variation or range in quality is smaller within groups than it is over the whole 
range of the commodity. 
To develop homogenous groups by quality to facilitate orderly marketing of a 
commodity. 
Grain grades are established under the U.S. Grain Standards Act while other 
grades are established under several different pieces of legislation , including the 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. Grades and standards exist for virtually all 
agricultural commodities. Most grades are primarily designed to facilitate trading 
at the wholesale market level although grades such as those on beef have a 
definite consumer orientation. 
Once grades are established, they are very difficult to change. In addition , there 
is resistance to the establishment of consumer oriented grades because 
opportunities for product differentiation (advertising) are reduced. Questions 
exist regarding the extent to which grades should reflect the end use of the 
product. Frequently, private grades and USDA grades reflect a different set of 
factors. Over time, grades and standards tend to become unresponsive to 
consumer preferences, probably because of resistance to changing the grades. 
• Grades increase the quantity of information available to buyers and sellers. 
• Grades increase the accuracy of pricing within different quality classes of the 
commodity. 
• Grades reduce the opportunity for abuse and misunderstanding between buyers 
and sellers of commodities that are sold without buyer inspection . 
• Grades force the quality marketed to the lowest acceptable level of each grade. 
• Grades reduce the opportunity for product differentiation. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Principal and Interest Deferrals 
Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
Principal deferrals- borrowers are not required to make principal payments on 
part or all of the debt for a designated time period, but are required to :,pay 
interest. Interest deferrals- borrowers are not required to make interest 
payments on part or all of the debt for a designated time period. but interest 
would accrue and be added to the debt. 
To allow a borrower with cash flow problems time to restructure debt or recover 
from adverse economic pressure. 
Used when adverse economic conditions are expected to be temporary or time is 
needed to restructure the operation to alleviate cash flow problems. Most private 
lenders do not defer interest, but roll it into the principal of the loan. This 
policy results from legal limitations on the collection of interest which is past due 
for longer than a specified period . Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) uses 
a combination of a principal deferral and interest waiver in their debt adjustment 
program. A borrower may defer a portion of the principal up to 5 years and 
accrue no interest on the deferred portion if it is necessary for the operation to 
meet cash flow requirements. 
Principal deferrals have tended to be used by private lenders in conjunction with 
disaster clauses tied to low production levels or commodity prices. Have 
provided a temporary solution to temporary financial problems. Where 
problems are of a long-term nature, deferrals may simply be delaying the 
inevitable. 
• Deferrals can temporarily reduce cash flow requirements of debt servicing. 
• If the financial stress is due to long-term economic pressures, deferrals of 
interest payments make matters worse and further weaken the borrower's 
financial position. 
• At the end of the deferral period, either the debt will have to be reamortized 
over a longer period, or it will be necessary to increase payments because of 
the larger outstanding balance. 
• If financial stress persists and asset markets continue to soften, lenders will 
experience even greater losses and loan risks. 
• High (low) interest rates can make the carrying cost of a principal deferral 
program very (moderately) expensive. 
• If recovery does not occur, public cost could be high due to losses on direct 
government loans. 
• Principal and interest deferrals can create a great deal of ill will on the part of 
producers who are paying their debts. 
• May aid in keeping assets (land and machinery) off of an already glutted 
market. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\Vhen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Interest Buy-Down 
Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
An interest rate buy-down involves an interest rate reduction on existing loans 
with the government paying a portion of the cost. 
To improve a producer's financial position by reducing interest cost. 
The interest rate buy-down provided for in the 1985 farm bill allows FmHA to 
pay 50 percent of the total cost of reducing the interest rate to the borrower, up 
to a maximum of 4 percentage points. The buy-down, however, wiII only be 
approved if there is no alternative way to project a positive cash flow. The 
duration of the buy-down may not exceed 3 years. A number of states have also 
implemented interest buy-down programs. 
Interest rate buy-downs can be used to restructure debt held by private lenders 
when there is a reasonable chance the borrower can recover. The program has 
also been used to reduce the workload for an overburdened FmHA by leaving 
debt servicing in the hands of private lenders. Lender participation has been less 
than might have been anticipated because of the requirement to accept a lower 
rate of return. State programs have encountered considerably higher costs than 
had been explicitly recognized or anticipated. 
• Private lender participation depends on whether they stand to lose less by no 
longer financing th.e borrower or by accepting a lower return in anticipation 
that the borrower's situation will improve. 
• Interest rate buy-downs can result in large public outlays. 
• Rural communities benefit directly if the buy-down reduces borrowers' cash 
flow burden and/or the number of farm liquidations. 
• Since interest buy-downs are temporary, they benefit financially stressed 
borrowers only in the short-run. 
• Interest buy-downs can create a great deal of ill will on the part of producers 
who are paying their debts. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Conseq uences: 
Principal Buy-Down 
Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
A principal buy-down is a reduction or forgiveness of part of a borrower's debt 
in return for some form of compensation. 
To reduce loan levels in line with lower asset values and to reduce farmers' debt 
servicing requirements. 
Used when economic conditions are such that a reduction in total debt is the only 
way a farm can remain solvent and the farm's failure would have a politically 
unacceptable impact on asset markets. Since September 1984 FmHA is allowed 
to issue guarantees of up to 90 percent on loans classified as substandard by the 
lender's supervising agency. To be eligible for the program. the lender is 
required to write-down at least 10 percent of the loan principal or a present value 
equivalent interest rate write-down. The borrower also has to be able to project 
the ability to cash flow the restructured loan. 
In cases where the potential losses are reduced, private lenders have been willing, 
in some instances, to write-down part of the outstanding principal and restructure 
a borrower's payments in exchange for a FmHA guarantee on the remaining 
debt. Because the principal must be reduced to the point where the loan will 
cash flow and the guarantee can be for no more than 90 percent of the reduced 
principal, the program has not been widely used. 
• Principal buy-downs may make it possible for borrowers to service their 
remaining debt obligations. 
• Although a government guarantee on the remaining debt can protect against 
further losses, private lenders still suffer an equity loss equal to the 
write-down. 
• Principal buy-downs can support asset values by reducing the number of farm 
liquidations. 
• Principal buy-downs can result in large public costs if economic conditions fail 
to recover and the government must pay banks for losses on guaranteed loans. 
• Principal buy-downs can create a great deal of ill will on the part of producers 
who are paying their debts. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\Then Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Principal and Interest \Vaivers 
Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
Principal and interest waivers are a forgiveness of some portion of a borrower's 
debt obligation. 
To minimize losses and/or stabilize asset markets. 
FmHA's debt adjustment program combines a deferral of principal with a waiver 
of the interest on the deferred principal for up to 5 years. Private lenders have 
written down principal and accrued interest to minimize losses when they feel the 
borrower can adequately service the remaining debt. 
Interest waivers have been used as a means of minimizing long-run losses when 
adverse economic pressures reduce borrowers' ability to service debt and 
widespread foreclosures would disrupt asset markets principal. The borrower 
must have a reasonable chance of financial solvency with debt waivers. There has 
been a hesitancy to utilize this option on the hope that financial conditions would 
improve. \Vaivers have, therefore, been a last resort option. 
• \Vaivers may make it possible for borrowers to service their remaining debt 
obligations. 
• V/aivers by public lenders result in substantial costs to taxpayers. 
• Interest waivers create a more politically acceptable way to forgive debt than do 
principal waivers, although the actual cost is the same. 
• Principal and interest waivers can create a great deal of ill will on the part of 
farmers who are paying their debts. 
• Principal and interest waivers represent direct subsidies to the borrowers who 
receive them. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\Then Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Two-Tier Debt Restructuring 
Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
The program would involve classifying a borrower's debt into two tiers. Tier-one 
debt-debt the borrower could reasonably repay over the next 5 years, under 
"normal" conditions, with payment made on principal and interest at the current 
market rate. Tier-two debt-all remaining debt would carry a minimum interest 
rate and no principal payments would be required on this debt. Each year the 
amount of tier-two debt equal to the principal payment on tier-one debt would 
shift to tier-one, until all of the restructured debt was repaid. 
To restructure debt based on the repayment ability of the operation. 
The program was first proposed by the American Farm Bureau in 1985 to deal 
with the existing financial crisis. Any new short-term operating debt would be 
scheduled for repayment within each production and/or marketing year or offset 
by a minimum inventory of 120 percent for crops and 130 percent for livestock. 
Approval for new debt would require demonstration of repayment capacity in 
addition to the repayment requirements of the two-tier program. If a financial 
analysis reveals that no reasonable solution exists for a farmer's financial 
problems and that profitability is not possible through the two-tier debt 
restructuring, then partial or total liquidation of the operation would occur. 
This proposal has not been tried in agriculture. It is similar in philosophy to 
existing practices involving delinquent foreign debt. 
• The program has the economic advantage of being tied to a repayment 
philosophy based on both projected cash flow and profitability. 
• Because of the profitability requirements, structural adjustment would continue 
to take place in agriculture. 
• The program could help avoid overreaction by agricultural lenders and asset 
markets. 
• If the interest rate on tier-two debt is not subsidized, the potential cost to 
lenders is substantial. 
• If the interest rate on tier-two debt is subsidized, the program would involve 
significant public costs. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\\' hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Farm Credit Capital Corporation 
Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
The Farm Credit Capital Corporation is a separate entity of the Farm Credit 
System rechartered to: (1) direct the pooling and allocation of System risk 
capital, (2) purchase, restructure and/or dispose of distressed System assets , and 
(3) to manage the use and repayment of any eventual federal assistance. 
The Capital Corporation is intended to serve as the mechanism for allocating risk 
funds and federal assistance as needed to maintain the System's integrity. 
The Capital Corporation was originally chartered to facilitate the movement of 
the System 's capital assistance to and management of distressed assets in the 
Spokane and Omaha Farm Credit Districts. \Vith the passage of the 1985 Farm 
Credit Amendments Act. its role was expanded to assure the System 's own capital 
is fully utilized before any federal assistance is provided . 
In its implementation, the Capital Corporation experienced considerable delays 
and resistance in establishing guidelines for withdrawing capital from 
contributing districts and in developing uniform credit standards and control 
procedures. It is too early to know how any federal assistance will be handled . 
The precedence for assistance to the System was established at its inception when 
government funds were used to capitalize the System. 
• The Capital Corporation and the Farm Credit Amendments Act have reduced 
but did not eliminate System borrowers ' and investors ' fear that their 
investment would be lost. 
• The initial effect on investors was to lower the risk premium the System was 
paying for its funds. 
• If properly administered, the Capital Corporation and the increased regulatory 
authority of the Farm Credit Administration should improve the quality and 
uniformity of credit administration throughout the System. 
• The increased centralization of regulatory authority tends to reduce local 
autonomy and control over the System. 
• One of the key , and as yet undetermined , issues is the cost of any government 
assistance. If the funds are free or subsidized, the System could benefit 
tremendously in terms of rebuilding capital , but the cost would be passed on to 
the public. 
• Centralization of administering the System's distressed assets may increase the 
visibility and political sensitivity to such a level that the System will be unable 
to manage these assets in a businesslike manner. This would defeat much of 
the benefits afforded by the Capital Corporation concept. 
• The purchase of distressed assets creates a source of liquidity for institutions 
with large portfolios of nonperforming loans. 
• If the distressed assets are conservatively valued and purchased at a discount, 
the Capital Corporation will have increased flexibility in restructuring 
distressed credit. 
• Increased liquidity, lower cost of funds, and capital assistance can contribute to 
the stabilization of farm asset values by reducing pressure on System 
institutions to acquire and liquidate collateral. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Direct Government Loans 
Credit Programs, Government Loans 
Direct government loans involve a government agency lending money to 
specified categories of borrowers for specific purposes. Frequently such loans are 
subsidized and made at an interest rate which is less than either the cost to the 
government or the market rate of interest for comparable loans from private 
lenders. 
To provide loan funds for purposes deemed to be in the public interest to 
borrowers who cannot obtain financing either in adequate amounts or at 
reasonable terms from private lenders. 
FmHA has been the federal government's agricultural lending agency. Several 
states have also initiated agricultural loan programs. FmHA makes both farm 
operating and farm ownership loans . Interest rates on these loans are tied to the 
government 's cost of borrowing and are thus lower than comparable conventional 
loans. A special limited resource loan program exists for farmers whose financial 
condition is such that they cannot afford to pay the normal interest rate. The 
minimum interest rate on these loans is usually about half the normal rate. 
Direct government agricultural loans are made primarily to farmers and ranchers 
who cannot qualify for adequate financing from other lenders. These loans are 
not intended to supplant or compete with credit available from conventional 
lending sources. They are intended to bear the financial and market risk 
conventional lenders are unwilling or unable to bear. 
The government's share of total producer loans have tended to increase causing 
concern that government credit may become the major source of agricultural 
credit. Concerns also exist that loans made by government agencies are subject to 
political influence. Yet Congress favors the government credit option because 
the loan is an asset as opposed to a direct government outlay. Foreclosure on 
government loans has been difficult and subject to strong political resistance . 
• Subsidized interest rates and more liberal credit terms can encourage new 
entrants and provide continued financing for segments of agriculture that 
suffer from surplus resources and production. 
• As a policy tool , direct loan programs can be used to guide resources into or 
out of agriculture. 
• Direct loan programs can be used to manage the rate at which asset markets 
adjust to changing economic conditions. 
• Interest subsidies and the cost of administering direct loan programs can be 
very costly to taxpayers. 
• Direct loans can be used to encourage the adoption of new technology. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Guaranteed Loans 
Credit Programs, Government Loans 
Guaranteed loans involve a government agency agreeing to protect a private 
lender against some or all potential losses resulting from borrower default. 
To encourage private lenders to make and service loans they would not make 
without a loan guarantee. 
Guaranteed loans are used to encourage private lenders to make, service, or 
restructure loans to borrowers who exceed the lender 's risk requirements. They 
have also been used to encourage lenders to make loans to young farmers and to 
minorities. FmHA can guarantee both operating loans and farm ownership loans 
made by private lenders. The loans are funded and serviced by the private lender 
subject to FmHA approval. Guarantees can be extended for up to 90 percent of 
the loan amount. Loan guarantees have political appeal because they are low 
cost in the short-run and because the funds flow through the private sector. 
Guarantees have been moderately effective in encouraging lenders to make new 
loans. Many lenders feel the return from this type of loan is not worth the time 
and red tape involved in meeting the terms of the guarantee provisions. There is 
also some concern about how the terms of the guarantee would be interpreted in 
the event of borrower default. The greatest use of loan guarantees has been to 
restructure existing loans to avoid or reduce potential losses. Lenders have also 
used loan guarantees wheIf financing ventures or enterprises with which they 
have limited experience, or where the size of the loan involved putting a 
significant portion of the institution 's capital at risk. Some lenders use loan 
guarantees as a means of servicing borrowers who would otherwise exceed the 
institution's legal lending limit. Others use guaranteed loans to increase profits 
by discounting the guaranteed portion into secondary markets. Pressures are 
increasing to make FmHA largely a loan guarantee agency. 
• Loan guarantees can help financially strapped farmers who could recover with 
continued financing and restructured loan terms. 
• They can encourage private lenders to finance new enterprises and 
technologies. 
• If the guaranteed loans are not financially sound, the program can result in 
large longer-run public outlays. 
• Properly structured, a loan guarantee program may provide the time necessary 
to implement a more permanent solution, thus protecting farm asset markets 
from collapse. 
• Loan guarantee programs essentially become lender bailouts when improperly 
structured or when no feasible long-term solution exists. 
• Loan guarantee programs can result in new entrants and continued financing 
for those segments of the industry that already suffer from surplus resources 
and production. 
• Rural communities may realize marginal benefits since losses that would 
otherwise be borne by firms in the local community would be borne by 
taxpayers. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Economic Emergency Loan Program 
Credit Programs, Government Loans 
Economic emergency loans are government loans intended for farmers who are 
suffering economic hardships due to national or regional economic stress, or 
from general tightening of credit, high costs of production, or low farm product 
prices. 
To make credit available to farmers suffering financial hardship from economic 
forces beyond their control. 
The program was created in 1978 and administered by the FmHA primarily to 
refinance debts and provide operating expenses to continue farming. Loans were 
made regardless of whether financing could be obtained elsewhere. New loans 
under this program have not been made since 1984. 
The program made billions of dollars of subsidized credit available at a time 
when real interest rates were low to negative. In many respects, it exacerbated 
the problem by deferring normal market adjustments, holding excess resources in 
agriculture, and artificially supporting asset values. When farm income began to 
turn down in the mid-1970s, farmers who were only marginally successful even in 
good times, and farmers who had inadequate repayment capacity, found credit 
markets tightening up. At the same time, the land market was relatively tight, 
although there were successful operators who would have purchased assets if the 
market had been allowed to force unsuccessful operators out of farming. Instead, 
the economic emergency loan program was created on the basis that the problem 
was short-run. As a result, excess resources were held in agriculture instead of 
being moved out. 
• Additional credit can not correct an income problem. 
• While credit is a liquidity management tool which can be used to bridge 
short-term cash flow deficiencies and to structure capital debt in line with the 
repayment ability of the assets financed, it will not correct long-term 
profitability or liquidity problems. 
• Interest rates serve to ration available credit. Subsidized rates and loans based 
on other than repayment ability tend to distort the allocation process. 
• The program made subsidized loans available to borrowers who were much 
larger than the FmHA's traditional family-size farm requirements. 
• The definition of economic emergency was so broad that the program led to 
many widely documented abuses. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Conseq uences: 
Emergency Disaster Loan Program 
Credit Programs, Government Loans 
The emergency disaster loan program is a government loan program which 
makes credit available to farmers in areas devastated by natural disasters. 
To help farmers recover from the effects of natural disasters. 
FmHA makes disaster loans in locations designated as disaster areas by the 
President or by the Secretary of Agriculture. These loans can be made to 
compensate for (1) actual physical losses directly related to the disaster, (2) 
annual production expenses and other needs arising from natural disasters, 
providing the borrower has some "all-risk" crop insurance coverage, if available, 
and (3) major adjustments in the farming operation necessitated by a disaster. 
Emergency disaster loans have been used to help farmers recover from losses 
experienced as the result of natural disasters. They have also encouraged 
expanded production of crops in high risk areas. Interest rates on disaster loans 
are based on the government's cost of borrowing for those able to qualify for 
credit elsewhere and subsidized to farmers unable to obtain credit elsewhere. 
• Crop production is encouraged in high risk areas. 
• Credit assistance is provided at times when it is needed most. 
• Subsidized interest rates pass part of the recovery cost on to the taxpayers. 
• Producers are discouraged from obtaining adequate insurance coverage from 
private vendors. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
"'hen Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Farm Credit Administration (FCA) 
Credit Programs, Government Regulation and Intervention 
FCA is the regulatory agency for the Farm Credit System. 
To establish regulatory standards for the performance of the system. 
FCA has existed throughout the life of the Farm Credit System. Until the 
enactment of the 1985 Farm Credit Amendments Act, FCA performed dual 
regulatory, public relations, and advocacy functions. This Act materially 
strengthened FCA's regulatory role and eliminated its member controlled board 
of directors. 
Despite changes in its function over time. FCA continued to serve important 
advocacy and public relations functions for the Farm Credit System and had 
limited regulatory powers compared to the regulatory agencies for other financial 
institutions. Establishing lending policies and standards was considerably more 
decentralized. When the farm credit crisis developed in the 1980s, FCA became 
the brunt of criticism for not having provided adequate regulatory guidance and 
control. Its regulatory function was, therefore, materially strengthened, with the 
producer control structure severed. 
• The 1985 Farm Credit Act dramatically increased the regulatory role of FCA 
and reduced or eliminated its public relations and advocacy role. 
• Independence of the System 's banks in establishing policy is reduced. 
• Responsiveness of the System to changing conditions is increased. 
• The 1985 Farm Credit Act changed the function of FCA to more like the 
regulatory role of the regulators of other financial intermediaries. 
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Policy Tool: 
Polic)' Area: 
\\' hat It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Foreclosure l\'Ioratorium 
Credit Programs, Government Regulation and Intervention 
Foreclosure moratoria forces lenders to stop foreclosures on agricultural related 
loans. 
To temporarily relieve financially pressed borrowers of financial obligations 
associated with excessive debt. 
Moratoria were applied under the Frazier-Lemke Act in the 1930s to bankruptcy 
proceedings. The moratorium was applied to real estate mortgage loans. In 
recent years, various states have also instituted temporary moratoria on farm 
foreclosures. FmHA was prohibited from foreclosing on borrowers from May 
1983 through November 1985 as a result of the Coleman liS . Block lawsuit. 
During the 1930s' Frazier-Lemke Act moratorium, a farm was appraised and the 
courts granted a stay of proceedings for 3 years, during which time the farmer 
retained possession of the property and paid rent for its use. Within the 3 years 
the farmer could pay the appraised value and redeem the property. If the 
property was not redeemed, it was sold to satisfy the debt against it. The farmer 
was not held liable for loan amounts greater than the appraised value of the 
property or its sale price. The various moratoria imposed on or by the FmHA 
have simply been stays of foreclosure. The farmer was given time to restructure 
debt and service the loan obligations. 
• Security interest in farm collateral is materially reduced. 
• A moratorium tends to make credit less available and raise interest rates for 
those borrowers not subject to foreclosures in order to compensate lenders for 
the higher credit risks. 
• A moratorium can help temporarily stabilize asset values because fewer assets 
are forced on the market. 
• Costs to lenders resulting from the nonpayment of interest, collateral 
depreciation, and additional borrower operating losses during a moratorium 
can be substantial. 
• A moratorium can be successful only if the financial conditions of the firm 
and/or the industry improves during the period so (1) the borrower can pay 
the debts, or (2) the asset markets can absorb the assets at more favorable 
prices. 
• A moratorium serves to hold surplus resources in agriculture. 
• Conditional or limited moratoria can be used to encourage reluctant lenders to 
use public sector assistance programs or accept forbearance and other 
restructuring approaches. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
'Varehousing Farm Assets, Agriculture Conservation Corporation 
Credit Programs, Government Regulation and Intervention 
A proposal to form a government corporation to purchase assets (land and 
equipment) f.rom problem farm loans at a "fair" market value. Assets acquired 
under the program would either be retired or later resold or leased batk to 
farmers. 
To stabilize the value of agricultural assets and to prevent further erosion of 
farmers' equity and lenders' collateral values. 
An Agricultural Conservation Corporation was proposed as a limited life 
program to be used when adverse economic conditions result in large numbers of 
foreclosures and voluntary liquidations. The program would support asset values 
by taking surplus assets off the market. 
The program has not been implemented. The concept appeared to be rejected on 
the potential for extensive government ownership of farmland and equipment. 
• To the extent assets, particularly land, are retired from production, the 
program would serve a double purpose in asset stabilization and supply 
control. 
• Sale of assets would be very unpopular when they force down local land and 
equipment values. 
• The release price for assets would serve to set a ceiling on asset values until all 
assets in the program are sold. 
• By allowing lenders to sell acquired property and farmers to sell distressed 
assets, the program would reduce losses associated with foreclosures. 
• The initial cost to the government of acquiring sufficient assets to stabilize farm 
asset markets wou!d be substantial. 
• Losses to lenders and farmers resulting from owning assets earning less than 
their carrying costs would be passed to taxpayers. 
• Problems of establishing "fair" market value and targeting assistance would 
raise questions of equity and be difficult to administer. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
\Vhen Used : 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Secondary l\1arkets for Agricultural Loans 
Credit Programs, Secondary Financial l\1arkets 
Secondary markets involve the originating lender selling loans or claims on 
agricultural loans to investors. In its most limited sense, the process involves a 
direct transaction between the original lender and an investor. A potential exists 
for greater liquidity when brokers act as middlemen to facilitate the sale of loans 
or loan participations to investors. An extension would be to establish an 
agricultural credit corporation to pool loans and sell negotiable pooled 
participations (or mortgage bonds) to investors. 
To add liquidity, spread lending risks. and broaden the market for agricultural 
loans. 
Existing secondary markets for agricultural loans include the sale of farm 
mortgage loans by originating lenders to life insurance companies. There is a 
highly developed secondary market for FmHA guaranteed loans through brokers. 
Commercial banks have long used the sale of loan participations to 
correspondent banks as a means of funding agricultural loans. The Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks also discount short- and intermediate-term agricultural 
loans from commercial banks and agricultural credit corporations. These are 
funded by the sale of consolidated Farm Credit System bonds and notes. Major 
banks have also used bankers ' acceptances as a means of marketing agricultural 
loans in established secondary markets. 
The Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, correspondent banking relationships, and 
secondary markets for bankers acceptances and.government guaranteed loans 
provide several alternatives for marketing short- and intermediate-term 
agricultural loans. Secondary markets for farm real estate loans are not nearly so 
well developed. Most farm mortgages sold by originating lenders to insurance 
companies are on a prearranged basis. The concept of an "Aggie Mae" program 
to buy farm loans has been frequently proposed but never implemented. This 
program would initially involve the creation of a government-backed agricultural 
credit corporation to pool farm mortgages and sell pooled participations or 
mortgage bonds in a manner similar to the Federal National Mortgage 
Corporation which buys residential mortgages. Such a program could be used to 
purchase both high quality and weak loans by discounting the purchases to reflect 
the risk involved. 
• Secondary markets enable direct access to capital markets. 
• Secondary markets could add liquidity to the farm real estate mortgage market. 
• The "Aggie Mae" concept would likely require standardization of loan paper 
and utilization of public guarantees or commercial insurance as well as initial 
assistance from the federal or state governments to facilitate administrative 
arrangements. 
• Limitations on active secondary markets for agricultural loans involve the 
relatively high risk of agricultural loans, the flonuniformity of loan 
documentation and credit arrangements , the relatively small size of the loans, 
and the lack of mortgage guarantee insurance. 
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